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The Case for Differential Discounting:
How a Small Rate Change Could Help
Agencies Save More Lives and Make
More Sense
Melissa J. Luttrell*
Over the past thirty years, the dominant rationale for mandatory,
formal cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of federal health, safety and
environmental regulations has changed from “CBA operates as a
necessary institutional roadblock against power-hungry regulators” to
“CBA is a neutral tool that assists regulators in identifying welfaremaximizing regulatory options.” However, despite this change in intention
and justification, the actual CBA methodologies the OMB directs the
agencies to use haven’t changed much in three decades, and still reflect the
strong anti-regulation sentiment of the Reagan administration. One
methodological choice that continues to operate as a very powerful bias
against protective regulatory standards is the OMB directive that executive
agencies must discount the public health and environmental benefits of
regulation at the same rate used for monetary costs.
The standard argument against using a lower discount rate for health,
safety and environmental benefits is that this would cause agencies to defer
cost-beneficial regulations ad infinitum; under differential discounting, it is
argued, a beneficial regulation would always produce more net benefits if
its implementation were delayed another year, and so no rational agency
would ever implement anything. This article demonstrates that this
“perpetual delay” argument relies on an invalid assumption; once this
assumption is eliminated, any perpetual delay phenomenon disappears.
Next, several “opportunity cost” arguments for equal discounting are
shown to conflate the choices theoretically available to society as a whole
with the outcomes actually available to regulatory agency decision makers.
While the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually
displaced by regulations may be relevant considerations for regulators, the
*
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arguments—premised on opportunity cost—that logic compels equal
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits all fail.
Finally, the article summarizes and discusses the substantial evidence
that the discount rate agencies apply to the non-fungible, often intangible
public health and environmental benefits of regulation should be
significantly lower than the rate used for monetary costs within the same
cost-benefit analysis.
INTRODUCTION
In 1979 and 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan railed against
the “arrogance”1 of federal regulation of business and promised to take
major steps to rein in the executive agencies. 2 He kept his promise. One of
his first acts, upon taking office, was to establish a cabinet-level “Task
Force on Regulatory Relief,” populated with some of Washington’s most
ardent anti-regulation ideologues, and with the stated agenda of scaling
back the regulatory state and holding the regulators at bay. 3
Executive Order 12291 soon followed. It established that no major
executive agency rule could be so much as proposed in the Federal Register
until it passed a rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis. 4 The Task
Force, believing even Reagan’s own regulatory appointees would likely
oppose the order, had worked quickly to ensure it was finalized before any
new regulatory agency heads were in place. 5

1

Jane Seabarry, Reagan Decries Government; Too Much Government Denounced by
Reagan, WASH. POST, June 14, 1979, at D1.
2
Diane Curtis, Reagan Vows to Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1980, at A2 (“‘If I am elected, and have an administration, I’d go a lot further than
a little tinkering with regulations,’ Reagan said. ‘I’d like to get rid of several thousand of
what I think are unnecessary regulations that have caused your problems.’”); Merrill
Brown, Thumbs Could Twiddle When Regulations Burn, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1980, at
D1; Reagan’s Victory Buoys Business, CHEM. WEEK, Nov. 12, 1980, at 16 (“While he was
on the campaign trail, President-elect Ronald Reagan seemingly pushed all the right
buttons for business. He would . . . ease up on regulations to ‘get government off the backs
of the people,’ as Murray L. Weidenbaum, head of Reagan’s regulatory task force, put
it.”).
3
Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing the Establishment of the Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, Jan. 22, 1981, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=43635; Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45
MD. L. REV. 253 (1986). See also JAMES C. MILLER, FIX THE U.S. BUDGET!: URGINGS OF
AN “ABOMINABLE NO-MAN” 2–3 (Hoover Institution Press, 1994); Reagan’s Victory
Buoys Business, supra note 2, at 16.
4
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
5
MILLER, supra note 3, at 3. A draft of the executive order was circulated to the other
members of the cabinet over the Washington’s Birthday holiday weekend, and, despite
complaints from some cabinet members that they had been unable to have it reviewed by
attorneys over the long weekend, was signed by the president the next business day, Feb.
17, 1981. Id. at 3 n. 5.
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The dominant philosophy on the task force was a public choice
perspective of administrative rulemaking. 6 In the words of James Miller,
the task force member given primary responsibility for enforcing the
regulatory reform agenda at OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA): “Given that the raison d’être of regulators is to regulate,
they will produce regulations without end—bad ones as well as good
ones.”7
Considering this attitude, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the
specific methodologies Miller’s OIRA requested the agencies follow in
their cost-benefit analyses were biased against health, safety and
environmental protections, to the point where their likely economic effect
was to reduce net social welfare by causing agencies to under-regulate.8
What is surprising is that several quite powerful anti-regulation biases have
persisted through each update of the OIRA guidelines, and have remained
basically unchanged since the Reagan administration.9
6

Reagan Tells Regulators to Analyze Costs, CHEM. WEEK, Feb. 25, 1981, at 15
(“Under the new plan, OMB has unprecedented authority to veto and
rewrite regulations even before executive agencies officially propose them. While this
power is likely to be challenged in the courts, Reagan’s deregulators feel it’s needed, since
even the best-intentioned appointees can be ‘captured’ by the agencies they head. . . . The
order will place a heavy procedural burden on the agencies, which are struggling to meet
statutory deadlines while facing major personnel and budget cutbacks.”); see also Frank B.
Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of
Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988) (the impetus for E.O. 19221 was “President
Reagan’s perception that federal government agencies overregulate”); MILLER, supra note
3, at 2.
7
MILLER, supra note 3, at 2; Lawrence Mosher, Reaganites, with OMB’s List in Hand,
Take Dead Aim at EPA’s Regulations, NAT’L J., Feb. 14, 1981, at 256 (“James C. Miller
III, head of the OMB office that compiled an analysis of environmental regulations by
EPA: ‘We’re going to be putting down very hard rules for them.’”).
8
Cf. RICHARD L. REVSZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 11
(Oxford University Press 2008); see also discussion infra note 9.
9
Examples of anti-regulation biases that have persisted through each version of these
guidelines, besides the discounting requirement that is the subject of this paper, include the
manner in which regulatory costs and benefits are quantified and monetized (as applied,
these requirements have tended systematically to undervalue regulatory benefits, which
tend to be more difficult than costs to quantify and monetize, while the process for
estimating costs tends to produce inflated numbers). See LISA HEINZERLING, COMMENTS
ON DRAFT OMB REPORT AND COST-BENEFIT GUIDELINES, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE
REGULATION (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2003report/251.pdf; Frank Clemente & Melissa Luttrell,
Comments on the 2001 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations, PUB. CITIZEN (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACFCF.pdf; see also David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006) (agency cost-benefit analyses systematically point agencies
toward less protective regulations); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting
the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002)
(CBA cost estimates tend to be too high). In addition, agencies are specifically directed not
to be conservative in their assumptions regarding risks to public health and the
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Executive Order 12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12866,10
have long been unpopular with environmentalists, consumer groups, and
other public-interest constituencies that oppose the use of CBA as a
decision criterion. In February 2009, the Obama administration solicited
recommendations for a replacement executive order, receiving a sizable
response.11 But Executive Order 12866 was never replaced, and, on
January 18, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order 13563, reaffirming his administration’s commitment to CBA of new executive
agency regulations (a process still overseen by OIRA), and directing the
agencies to apply CBA principles to a comprehensive look-back review of
existing regulations.12
The current OIRA administrator is Cass Sunstein, widely regarded as
one of the most brilliant legal minds of our day; at the time of his
nomination, Sunstein was described by Obama as both a “dear friend” and
“the most cited law professor on any faculty in the United States.”13 In his
extensive scholarship on CBA, Sunstein strongly supports the use of CBA
in administrative decision-making, 14 although he has expressed concern
that real-world agency analyses have often been crudely done, 15 have
environment, but instead to use “best estimates” of risk—another practice that likely
causes agencies systematically to underestimate the need for regulatory protections. See
Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 27–29 (1998).
OMB guidance documents implementing the cost-benefit analysis requirements of
Executive Order 12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12866, include: OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, INTERIM REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS GUIDANCE (1981), reprinted
in 12 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 258 (1981); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Regulatory Impact
Analysis Guidance, Appendix V, in REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 653–66 (1990); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT
RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1992), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a94/a094.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
12866 (1996), available at http://www.neutralsource.org/content/article/detail/727; OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (Sept. 17, 2003). See also
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Check
list.pdf (last visited November 16, 2010).
10
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
11
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Request for Comments on OMB Recommendations for a
New Executive Order on Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819-01 (Feb. 26, 2009); see
also set of 183 public comments compiled at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
12
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
13
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama
Announces another Key OMB Post (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/ the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-Another-Key-OMB-Post.
14
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2002).
15
Robert Hahn & Cass Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1514–15
(2002) (“The information provided in an RIA is often badly incomplete, and the level of
detail and analytical sophistication varies across agencies and types of regulations.”).
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sometimes been improperly biased against regulation, 16 and can produce
almost indeterminate results.17 Interestingly, in this (pre-OIRA
appointment) scholarship on CBA, Sunstein noted that agencies technically
are not bound by OMB’s methodological guidelines on CBA; 18 however, in
his present position, he is working to ensure that agencies comply more
fully with these guidelines’ “requirements”19 and so it must be assumed
that the OMB’s methodological guidelines will continue to play a
significant role in shaping federal health, safety and environmental
standards.
The latest OMB guidelines enumerating the specific methodologies
agencies are to use in their cost-benefit analyses of regulations (“OMB
Guidelines”) were released in 2003.20 While there are a number of
methodological choices in the OMB Guidelines that are likely to cause
agency analyses to be systematically biased against health, safety and
environmental protections,21 this paper focuses on only one: the directive
that agencies must apply the same discount rate to regulatory costs as to
regulatory benefits. The merits of CBA, as a decision-making tool, are
hotly contested. But whether one supports the current role of CBA in
agency health, safety and environmental rulemaking, or whether one
opposes this role on ethical, legal, and/or policy grounds (as I do), 22 it
seems uncontroversial that the agencies producing CBAs (whether under
duress or out of an affirmative desire to employ the technique) should
endeavor to eliminate any improper, anti-regulation biases contained within
the methodology, and that OIRA should support any methodological
changes that would improve the accuracy and rationality of agency CBAs.
Discounting can have an enormous impact on how good (or bad) a
regulation appears. The primary reason for discounting is to account for the
changing value of money, depending on when in time the money will be
received or spent. The present value of a dollar received today is greater
16

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 227 (“the use of a [OMB-recommended] 7 percent
discount rate, if it decisively affects the ultimate decision, would seem to be legally
doubtful”).
17
Id. at 153–90.
18
Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money,
and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 172 (2007); see also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 14, at 225.
19
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST, supra note 9. Of course,
seeking expanded compliance is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that compliance
is voluntary.
20
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9. Note that EPA
publishes its own guidelines on the economic analysis of regulations; these guidelines, like
OMB’s guidelines, call for the use of equal discounting. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 6–20 (2010) (“In all cases
social benefits and costs should be discounted in the same manner[.]”).
21
HEINZERLING, supra note 9; see also supra text of note 9.
22
See, e.g, Clemente & Luttrell, supra note 9, at 2.
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than that of a dollar to be received twenty years from now, even controlling
for inflation; this is primarily because a dollar received today can be
invested and made to grow. For this reason, economic analyses that involve
monetary gains and losses over time generally employ discounting.
But the OMB requirement for equal discounting means that all goods—
even health and environmental benefits that cannot be invested—must be
discounted at the same rate as monetary costs. Such discounting can
dramatically lower the apparent value of health, safety and environmental
regulation:
Consider, for example, OSHA’s lockout/tagout regulation[.] OMB has
estimated the regulation costs $70.9 billion for each premature death it
prevents. OSHA, which did not discount future benefits, estimated the
cost for each premature death avoided as between $190,000 and $1.2
million. 23

The effect of discounting is especially pronounced for health standards
that prevent long-latency diseases. For example, the Mine Safety and
Health Administration’s proposed new respirable coal dust exposure limit
will protect miners from diseases, such as black lung disease and
emphysema, that often take decades to materialize. 24 In addition, the miners
who have already had occupational exposure to coal dust at current levels
will continue to have a heightened risk for disease and premature death
long after the new permissible exposure limit takes effect, and possibly for
the rest of their lives; MSHA has therefore concluded that its rule will offer
the greatest protection to workers who enter the mining occupation after the
rule takes effect, and it estimates it will take approximately 45 years for the
entire workforce to turn over.25 Since the delay between occupational
exposure and consequential premature death may be 40 years (or more) 26—
and since it will take about 45 years for the relevant workforce to turn
over—if the number of affected workers remains at current levels, it may
well take 85 years or more for the full annual lifesaving benefits of the
regulation to be actually observed.
Figure 1, below, illustrates the effect of equal discounting on rules—
like MSHA’s new respirable coal dust standard—that have substantial
upfront costs but are expected to take many decades to demonstrate their
full lifesaving potential. This area chart shows annual net benefits over time
23

Testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro before the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, April 22, 1999.
24
Mine Safety & Health Admin., Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine
Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,412 (proposed Oct.
19, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 70, 71, 72, 75, and 9).
25
See MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS FOR LOWERING MINERS’ E XPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST
INCLUDING CONTINUOUS PERSONAL DUST MONITORS 11 (2010).
26
See id., see also Arévalo Galeano et al., Abstract: Anthracosilicosis: A Rare Clinical
and Radiological Presentation Simulating Lung Metastases, 51 RADIOLOGIA 601 (2009)
(latency of more than 50 years).

86

WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 3:80

for a hypothetical proposed rule that would prevent premature death from
exposure to toxins, when costs are discounted at 5% and benefits are
discounted at either 5%, 1.5%, or 0%. This hypothetical rule has total social
costs of $93 million in 2011, its first year in effect, with annual costs
declining until they stabilize, in 2017, at $25 million. The benefits, in the
form of averted deaths, first become patent 23 years after the rule begins to
generate costs, with the annual number of deaths averted gradually
increasing until it stabilizes, in 2099, at 30 averted deaths per year. (CBA
requires that lives saved be converted into dollar equivalents; here, averted
deaths are valued at $9,000,000 in constant, inflation-adjusted 2011
dollars.)

Figure 1: Present Value of Annual Net Benefits for Hypothetical Health
Standard over Time, under Equal and Differential Discounting

Under equal discounting, when both costs and benefits are discounted
at 5%, this hypothetical rule fails CBA. That the rule, over its lifetime,
would have net social costs under equal discounting (at 5%) can be seen
graphically: under equal discounting, the area above the horizontal $0 line
is smaller than the area below it. However, if the agency analyst were
permitted to use differential discounting, this rule could easily pass CBA.
When regulatory benefits are discounted at 0%, the rule’s benefits are
overwhelmingly greater than its costs (again, this can be seen graphically
by comparing the area above the $0 line with the area below it), and this
difference would be even greater if the rule’s continuing benefits were
plotted out for additional years. Even when benefits are discounted at 1.5%,
the hypothetical rule still easily passes CBA. In short, the decision to
discount the health and environmental benefits of regulation at the same
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rate as monetary costs can have a major impact on how cost-beneficial a
rule appears, and can determine whether a rule passes CBA at all.
In responding to critics of equal discounting, both OMB and the leading
commentators supporting equal discounting concede that health goods
cannot be invested like money and thereby made to grow.27 Instead, the
case for discounting all goods at the monetary rate is largely a negative
case: failure to discount costs and benefits at the same rate, it is argued,
would cause absurd, paradoxical results. 28 While there are a number of
positive arguments for applying some discount rate to intangible regulatory
benefits that will accrue to the future, they generally do not mandate equal
discounting. 29 The exceptions, the positive arguments for equal
discounting, are all variations of a flawed opportunity cost argument.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will show that differential
discounting30 will not create any paradoxes or generate absurd results. The
standard argument against using a lower discount rate for health benefits is
that this would cause agencies to defer good (or, “cost-beneficial”)
regulations ad infinitum, because at any point in time such a regulation
would always produce more benefits if it were started in the future than if it
were started in the present. This argument is incorrect. Actually, the only
cost-beneficial regulations that would be perpetually deferred under
differential discounting (even assuming that a 0% rate is used for health,
safety and environmental benefits) are those that: (1) must expire after
some fixed period of time (e.g., the agency must issue a regulation that will
last for one year only, and it is impossible for the program to be extended);
27

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34; John D.
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
395, 503 (2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 226.
28
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34; John D.
Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 991 (2006).
29
The rationales for discounting health, safety and environmental benefits cited by
OMB in its latest methodological guidelines are opportunity cost (see infra Part II), the
necessity of avoiding paradoxical results (see infra Part I), declining marginal utility (see
infra Part III), and pure time preference. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY
ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 31–36. The discussion of these rationales in this paper is
generally limited to a consideration of whether or not they should be understood to
prohibit differential discounting. Note that pure time preference and declining marginal
utility, while relevant to a discussion of what the discount rates for health and
environmental goods should be, are not relevant to the debate over whether the rates used
for these goods must always be precisely equal to whatever rate is used for money. For a
more complete discussion of the various rationales for discounting, see Richard L. Revesz
& Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
1097 (2011).
30
As used in this paper, “differential discounting” means discounting where the rate
used for benefits is less than the rate used for costs within the same analysis; discounting
where the rate for benefits is greater than the rate for costs, while theoretically possible, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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and (2) are not issued pursuant to any statutory or judicial deadline. A
review of recently proposed rules reveals that differential discounting
would not perpetually delay any real-world regulations.
Part II addresses various incarnations of the opportunity cost argument
for equal discounting, arguing that each errs in including chimerical
“opportunities” in their calculations of the opportunity costs of regulating.
And while the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually
displaced by regulations may be relevant considerations for regulators, the
arguments—premised in opportunity cost—that logic compels equal
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits all fail.
Having untethered the discount rate for health and environmental goods
from the monetary rate, this article next examines the strong evidence that
the values of health and environmental benefits are not depreciating as
quickly as money, or, in some cases, at all, and that any discount rate used
for health and environmental goods should be significantly lower than the
rate used for money within the same cost-benefit analysis. Much of this
evidence comes from the health economics literature. Perhaps because they
mostly work in cost-effectiveness analysis, 31 (as opposed to CBA), their
work has often been ignored by the law review literature on CBA
discounting. However, the question of the rate at which these benefits
become more or less valuable depending on when in time they will occur is
relevant to both disciplines, and the CBA debate on discounting has much
to gain from better understanding the relevant work of health economists.
I. THE PARALYZING PARADOX AND INFINITE DELAY
The OMB Guidelines direct the executive agencies to use the same
discount rate for health and environmental benefits as for monetary costs in
their CBAs, “in order to avoid well-documented perversities.” 32 And chief
among these “perversities” is the Keeler-Cretin paradox, summarized here
by former OIRA administrator John Graham:
The paradox of delayed lifesaving, also named the “Keeler-Cretin
paradox,” starts with the seemingly innocuous assumption that the analyst
assigns a lower discount rate (possibly zero) to lives saved than is
assigned to dollars. But then the analyst is asked to compare a promising
lifesaving rule to the same rule delayed for a year. Under certain
conditions, Keeler and Cretin show that the rule is a better investment if it
31

Cost-effectiveness analysis generates ratios showing how competing programs
compare with each other; in cost-effectiveness analysis (unlike CBA), either the costs or
the benefits are fixed. See Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1080 (2003). CBA, on the other hand, is used to generate a
dollar amount that represents the net societal benefits (or costs) of an individual proposal;
unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, CBA requires monetization of all the goods considered
in the analysis. OMB, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 9–12.
32
John D. Graham, Valuing the Future: OMB’s Refined Position, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 51,
52 (2007); and see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9,
at 34.
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is delayed because future lives saved have been discounted at a lower rate
than future costs. By the same logic, it can be shown that the lifesaving
regulation should be delayed indefinitely, which Keeler and Cretin argue
is perverse. 33

Though Graham—who was head of OIRA when the current guidelines
on CBA were released in 2003—uses the “under certain conditions”
qualifier above, elsewhere he has omitted it, arguing, without reservation,
that the paradox constrains agency analysts from ever using differential
discounting in a CBA. For example, in 2006, he stated: “The following
paradox results from applying a smaller annual rate of discount to benefits
than to costs: delaying an investment that saves lives in the future will
always be desirable if the analyst is permitted to assign a smaller discount
rate to future benefits than to costs.”34
This “paralyzing paradox” was first described in 1982 and 1983, when
Emmett Keeler and Shan Cretin published papers that purported to show
that, when costs are discounted and benefits are not, policymakers relying
on cost-effectiveness analysis will never start a program, because “[f]or any
attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program that should
be funded first.”35 And, when a positive, nonzero discount rate is used for
benefits, but benefits are discounted at a lower discount rate than costs,
Keeler and Cretin find that “a program can only be funded if the set of
programs under consideration has sharply decreasing returns.” 36 Otherwise,
if the programs under consideration have increasing or steady-state benefits
(or even slowly decreasing benefits), there will always be a more attractive
future program that should be prioritized over any current program, and the
decision maker will never be able to start anything. 37 In sum, Keeler and
Cretin find that using a positive, but lower, discount rate for benefits would
lead to the paralyzing paradox whenever the programs under consideration
do not have sharply decreasing returns (which is to say, it would almost
always lead to the paralyzing paradox), while using a 0% discount rate for
benefits would always paralyze the decision maker.
33

Graham, supra note 27, at 505.
Graham et al., supra note 28, at 991 (emphasis added); see also, Richard Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 988–89 (1999) (quoting Susan W. Putnam & John D. Graham,
Chemicals Versus Microbials in Drinking Water: A Decision Sciences Perspective, 85 J.
AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 57, 60 (1993) (“If a smaller discount rate were to be applied to
health than to money, it would always make sense to postpone adoption of public health
programs that invest money now for deferred health improvements. In short, society would
continually delay risk reduction into the future and impose the burdens on future
generations.”)).
35
Emmett B. Keeler & Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary
Effects, 29 MGMT. SCI. 300, 303 (1983).
36
EMMETT B. KEELER & SHAN CRETIN, DISCOUNTING OF NONMONETARY EFFECTS, THE
RAND CORPORATION, N-1875-HHS, at 5 (June 1982).
37
See id.
34
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While Keeler and Cretin’s inquiry focused on cost-effectiveness
analysis, their conclusions have come to be understood as applying with
equal force to CBA. 38 The Keeler-Cretin paradox has been very influential
among legal scholars who endorse CBA as a decision-making tool. For
example, according to Sunstein and co-author Arden Rowell, the KeelerCretin claim that “regulators will never enact programs if they discount
costs but not benefits . . . is one of the logical implications of refusing to
discount, and the fact that it entails a politically unacceptable outcome does
not mean that it is wrong.”39
And more than a decade of criticism, from both the economics literature
and the legal academy, has not diminished the influence of the KeelerCretin paradox. On the law side, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman
challenge what they see as an implicit assumption of economic
inefficiency—if all programs under consideration are cost-effective, they
argue, all should be financed, regardless of whether a future program has
greater net benefits than a current one; Heinzerling and Ackerman also
argue that even if failing to discount did mean net benefits would always
increase whenever regulations were delayed, real-world political pressure
would prevent decision makers from ever becoming paralyzed by this
phenomenon. 40 Richard Revesz argues that, contrary to the necessary
Keeler-Cretin assumption that delaying a program will not increase its
undiscounted costs, delaying a regulation is likely to increase its price,
especially in the environmental arena, where unaddressed problems tend to
worsen over time;41 he also argues that, as a practical matter, resources
cannot be transferred across projects as readily as Keeler and Cretin seem
to assume.42 Current OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein and former
administrator John Graham have found the arguments of Revesz,
Ackerman and Heinzerling unpersuasive; Sunstein and Graham both
respond similarly, arguing that discounting’s critics within the legal
academy have failed to deny the basic logic of the paradox, which, they

38

See, e.g., Graham, supra note 32, at 52 n. 7.
Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 176 n. 24, 198. According to Frank Ackerman
and Lisa Heinzerling, “current advocates of discounting increasingly point to the KeelerCretin Paradox as their last best defense.” FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING,
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF E VERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 192
(2004); see also The Regulators Best Friend?, THE ECONOMIST, April 2, 2005, at 72 (“If
regulators discounted costs but not lives saved, they would defer action indefinitely,
[Robert] Hahn points out.”).
40
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 192–93; see also Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999).
41
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 990 (1999); see also Revesz &
Shahabian, supra note 29.
42
Id. at 989–92.
39
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conclude, continues to offer compelling justification for equal
discounting. 43
(Note that in their scholarship describing the paradox, Revesz and
Ackerman/Heinzerling attribute to Keeler and Cretin an “opportunity cost”
argument they did not actually make, i.e., that any money not immediately
spent on regulation could be invested and made to grow.44 The KeelerCretin perpetual delay phenomenon is not driven by any investment of
unspent funds; to the contrary, Keeler and Cretin assume the funds will not
be invested during the delay. Instead, the Keeler-Cretin paradox is driven
by the change in present value that occurs from delay alone, when the
discount rate for benefits is smaller than the rate used for costs, and a
regulatory program is delayed. (The relevance—to the differential
discounting debate—of the possibility that funds not spent on regulation
could be invested and made to grow during the period of delay is discussed
at length infra Part II.))
Economists, too, have attacked numerous Keeler-Cretin assumptions,
which they argue fail to correlate with the real-world programs typically
evaluated under cost-effectiveness analysis. 45 For example, economist Ben
A. Van Hout showed that no paradox will occur in cost-effectiveness
43

Graham, supra note 27, at 505 n. 478; Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 176 n. 24,
198 (discussing critiques by Revesz and Ackerman/Heinzerling, then citing Keeler and
Cretin in support of the argument that one problem with refusing to discount is “if the
refusal to discount will result in the postponement of protective programs, environmental
and otherwise, the future is to that extent hurt rather than helped.”).
44
From Revesz:
[A]ccording to Emmett Keeler and Shan Cretin: ‘The discounting of costs but not
benefits . . . has a paralyzing effect on a decisionmaker. . . . For any attractive
program, there is always a superior delayed program which should be funded first.
The result is that no program with a finite starting date can be selected.’ The idea
behind this position is that, instead of undertaking the environmental program, one
could invest the funds in an alternative project, watch the investment grow, and then
address the environmental problem at some time in the future. At this future time,
moreover, one would engage in the same calculus and decide to postpone the
environmental expenditure once more.
Revesz, supra note 41, at 989 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Priceless provides a
conceptually similar description of the paradox:
Suppose that monetary costs are discounted, but health and environmental benefits are
not. Suppose, also, that any number of human lives can be saved at a fixed cost per
life at any time. Then, at a discount rate of 7 percent, we could either save 100 lives
now, or put the money in the bank and have enough to save 107 lives next year. Since
the saved lives are not discounted, this delay increases the value of the benefits to
society by 7 percent, and should be preferred over the immediate life-saving
expenditure. But the same logic shows that it is even better to leave the money in the
bank for two years and then save 114 lives, and so on; it will always be better to wait
another year.
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 227.
45
For a survey of these arguments, see Angelina Lazaro, Theoretical Arguments for the
Discounting of Health Consequences, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS 943, 950–51 (2002); see
also Hugh Gravelle et al., Discounting in Economic Evaluations: Stepping Forward
Towards Optimal Decision Rules, 16 HEALTH ECON. 307 (2007).
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analysis when the programs under consideration are assumed to continue
indefinitely. 46 However, Van Hout’s argument, and the arguments of other
economists who have criticized the Keeler-Cretin paradox, has failed to
gain any traction in the law review literature and in OIRA. 47 Perhaps this is
because the health economics literature generally discusses differential
discounting in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, which is related to
CBA but different in several important ways,48 and it is not always
immediately clear which conclusions from the literature on costeffectiveness analysis are transferable to CBA.
This part will argue that the Keeler-Cretin paradox is not a legitimate
barrier to differential discounting in federal executive agency CBAs, and
will use examples to show that the argument that differential discounting
would always point regulatory decision makers toward perpetual delay of
cost-beneficial regulations does not hold up. The conclusion that
differential discounting in agency CBAs would not perpetually delay costbeneficial regulations holds, regardless of whether the regulation is
assumed to continue indefinitely, and regardless of whether benefits are
even discounted at all. In short, differential discounting will not direct
decision makers perpetually to delay cost-beneficial regulations.
A. CBA OVER AN INFINITE TIME HORIZON
Imagine a lifesaving regulation that requires $40 million in initial
capital costs and other costs this year, but causes no benefits this year.
After this year, total (monetary) costs will be $20 million per year, health
benefits will be $24 million per year, 49 and those cost and benefit streams
will continue indefinitely. 50 Assume the discount rate for costs is 3%, and
the discount rate for benefits is 1.5%.
The formula for calculating the present value of a perpetuity is:
P

46

Ben A. Van Hout, Discounting Costs and Effects: A Reconsideration, 7 HEALTH
ECON. 581 (1998); see also Hugh Gravelle & Dave Smith, Discounting for Health Effects
in Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 10 HEALTH ECON. 587, 592–93 (2001).
47
Revesz’s work is an exception. See Revesz, supra note 41, at 944 n.5.
48
See supra note 31 for a discussion of the differences between cost-effectiveness
analysis and CBA.
49
Or three lives saved per year, if the value of a statistical life is $8,000,000 in 2011.
50
This subpart assumes, like Van Hout, that the program under evaluation will continue
for infinity. The application of this assumption to the sample program considered here
differs significantly from Van Hout’s analysis, however, because Van Hout addressed the
Keeler-Cretin paradox in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, which compares the
cost-effectiveness of competing programs against each other, generally without
monetizing health benefits. See Van Hout, supra note 46, at 585–86; see also supra note
31 for a discussion of the differences between cost-effectiveness analysis and CBA.
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The present value of the total costs of the regulation will be equal to the
present value of the continuous stream of costs,
, plus the value of the
extra $20M in first year start-up costs, or:
51

The present value of the total benefits of the regulation will be equal to the
present value of the continuous stream of benefits minus $24M (this
adjustment is necessary because no benefits are obtained the first year), or:

The net present value (NPV) of the regulation equals the present value of
the total benefits minus the present value of the total costs:
Next, assume the same regulation is delayed one year. The present value of
the regulation’s total costs will now be equal to the present value of the
annual $20M cost stream, minus $20M (this subtraction from the present
value of the continuous cost stream is necessary to adjust for the fact that
there will be no costs this year), plus the present value of the extra $20M in
start-up costs that will be paid a year from now,52 or:
(

)

The present value of all benefits will now be equal to the present value of
the perpetual $24M stream of benefits, minus $24M (because there will be
no benefits this year), and minus the discounted value of the $24M in
benefits that will not be received next year, either, or:
(

)

1552M

Thus, the NPV of the regulation, delayed by one year, is $886M, which is
$3M less than the net benefits that would be obtained if the regulation were
implemented immediately. And if the regulation is delayed by yet another
year, its NPV will be still smaller:
(

(

)

(

)

)

(

(

)

(

)

)

Thus, when benefits are discounted at a lower rate than costs, delaying the
regulation will not necessarily yield higher net benefits in a CBA. The
argument, based on the work of Keeler and Cretin, that using a lower rate
to discount benefits than the rate used for costs in a CBA will always point
decision makers toward perpetually postponing beneficial regulations, is
wrong.
What happens to the NPV analysis if benefits are not discounted at all?
Because the costs are discounted, the costs will always resolve to a finite
51
52

Rounded to the nearest million.
The present value of a single receipt or payment of a future benefit (or cost) equals
(
)
.
(

)
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number; however, if a discount rate of zero is used for benefits, then the
value of the continuous stream of benefits will be infinite. Subtracting finite
costs (no matter what they are) from infinite benefits will always yield net
benefits of infinity. So, using zero discounting for benefits (but not costs),
the regulation’s NPV will always be equal to infinity, no matter when the
regulation begins.
This indeterminate result is not particularly helpful to the regulatory
decision maker who is trying to determine the optimal time to start a
regulation (an issue discussed below), but it is also not the “perverse” result
that has been repeated and repeated in the literature, namely, that “[f]or any
attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program which
should be funded first.”53 Instead, when only costs are discounted, and
programs are examined over an infinite time horizon, delaying a program
with a continuous, positive benefits stream will not influence net benefits
one way or the other.
B. FROM ZERO TO INFINITY
The net present value of a stable benefit stream over an infinite time
horizon is equal to infinity if no discounting of benefits is done, while
costs, no matter how large, will be finite if any discount rate is used for
costs. So, even a regulation that costs $10 million annually, but only
prevents, on average, one headache per year (with no other benefits) will
always produce positive “net benefits” in a CBA if benefits are not
discounted and any positive, nonzero discount rate is used for costs. In the
real world, agencies simply do not waste their energy on regulations with
such trivial benefits and such substantial costs, but this problem is a logical
implication of using a zero discount rate, and has salience for some
commentators.54
The legal scholars who make the case for zero discounting of intangible
regulatory benefits do not argue that any cost, no matter how great, is
sufficient to justify any ongoing regulatory benefit, no matter how small,
even though this conclusion might seem logically to follow from a refusal
to discount benefits in a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, discounting’s
skeptics argue that CBA is a poor decision-making tool, one that obfuscates

53

Keeler & Cretin, supra note 35, at 303.
E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 209, 216–17 (2007) (“The first problem [with refusing to discount benefits] is what I
have called the ‘permanent cost slam dunk.’ Suppose that a development policy will lead
to the permanent loss of some very inconsequential environmental amenity that has a value
of $1 in each period. With that loss extended for an infinite time horizon, the present value
of the environmental harm is infinite. No policy criterion with a finite payoff can ever
offer great enough benefits to offset this infinite loss. In contrast, with discounting, the
infinite stream of $1 losses has a present value of only 1/r, or $33 with a three percent
discount rate.”) (citation omitted).
54
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more than it clarifies, and one that should be abandoned. 55 Alternatives to
conventional CBA, which would present relevant data in an analytical
framework that lays out the costs and the benefits of different regulatory
options over time, with quantification but not monetization of intangible
goods, and without discounting of intangibles, have been offered. 56
With that understanding, I will now consider how a hypothetical agency
analyst who is absolutely committed to using a zero discount rate within the
context of an otherwise conventional CBA might address the “infinite
benefits” objection. There are several possibilities: (1) arbitrarily choose a
finite appraisal period, e.g., ten years, or fifty years, or five hundred years
(this option would run afoul of OIRA’s current—and rarely followed—
directive to look at a time period long enough to capture most of the rule’s
costs and benefits,57 since a zero percent discount rate means the
uncaptured regulatory benefits at any point in time will always be greater
that the benefits captured in the analysis); (2) use a very, very small
discount rate for benefits (e.g., 0.001%); or (3) make the time horizon finite
by identifying a date in the future when the regulation will probably stop
generating any benefits or costs (e.g., the regulation relates to public notice
that must be given before certain activities related to mountaintop removal
coal mining are undertaken, and we estimate all coal removable by this
method will be gone by year x).
This third option holds some promise.
Many regulations are wonderfully beneficial, and it seems reasonable to
say that, for example, the U.S. ban on DDT (which tends to persist in the
environment and does great damage to wildlife, and famously brought the
peregrine falcon to the very edge of extinction) will bring benefits forever.
But will it? Experts predict that about a billion years from now, as the sun
moves toward becoming a red giant, the Earth will be too hot to support life
of any kind. 58 This would seem to place an extreme outside limit on the
length of time any regulation will generate benefits and costs.
And other events will cause regulations to become obsolete far sooner
than one billion years from now: technology will change, our climate will
change, consumer populations and preferences will change, and nonrenewable natural resources will be depleted. And so, for example,
55

See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 9; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39.
See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008); see also ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 210–15.
57
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 15 (“The
time frame for your analysis should cover a period long enough to encompass all the
important benefits and costs likely to result from the rule.”).
58
Jeff Hecht, Moving the Earth: A Planetary Survival Guide, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 20,
2008, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14983-moving-the-earth-aplanetary-survival-guide.html?full=true; Sun Will Vaporize Earth Unless We Can Change
Our Orbit, SCIENCE DAILY, Feb. 24, 2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/02/080223130020.htm.
56
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regulations governing tobacco price supports became obsolete after
Congress ended the program.59 A regulatory requirement that had been
designed, in 1953, to ensure that clothing’s flame retardancy was
maintained under a then-current dry cleaning method became obsolete after
the EPA banned that method of dry cleaning. 60 One day, vehicles will
likely be powered by something other than petroleum products, because we
will run out of oil, or, as petroleum supplies dwindle, petroleum-derived
fuels will become more expensive than other fuel options, making the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s fuel economy standards
irrelevant; and so on. Even the best regulation will someday become
obsolete, and, at some point before infinity, all regulations will stop
generating costs and benefits.
The key point, in the context of examining the Keeler-Cretin paradox,
is that these end points are not written into the regulations; in general,
regulations don’t have built-in expiration dates that are tied to their
effective dates.61 An agency analyst comparing the net benefits of
regulating now with the net benefits of regulating a year from now should
consider whether the regulation has a built-in expiration date, and if it does,
whether delaying the regulation a year will mean the regulation will be in
effect for one year fewer, or whether delaying the regulation will instead
mean the same regulatory costs and benefits will be experienced for exactly
the same length of time, just delayed a year.
If a regulation’s provisions will be renewable or (as is far more likely)
continuous, then an analyst who is evaluating a regulation over a finite time
horizon should assume that delaying the regulation one year will mean one
fewer year that the regulation is in effect, because forces other than the
effective date of the regulation (such as the U.S. running out of nearsurface coal) are more likely than the exact timing of its effective date to
cause the regulation to stop providing any costs or benefits.
C. CBA OVER A FINITE PERIOD
Keeler and Cretin assumed that the program under analysis would last
for a finite period, and that delaying the program wouldn’t reduce its
benefits at all, but would only delay them. But that is not how regulations
work. Instead, the general rule is that delaying a regulation by a year means
there will be one fewer year of the regulation.
It is possible to imagine a regulatory program that is set up to ‘selfdestruct’ exactly a year (or ten years, or twenty years, or five hundred
years) after it first begins to generate benefits or costs. But this is not the
paradigmatic case. Instead, this condition, this necessary Keeler-Cretin
59

Dept. of Agriculture, Tobacco Transition Payment Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1463 (2005).
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Standard for the Flammability of Clothing Textiles,
16 C.F.R. § 1610 (2008).
61
See infra note 62.
60
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assumption that delaying the regulation would not diminish its
undiscounted benefits in any way, will almost never be satisfied by federal
executive agency regulations (i.e., the regulations that are analyzed under
OIRA’s methodological guidelines, which forbid differential discounting).
A review, completed in July and August 2010, of all fifteen
economically significant rules under EO 12866 review at OIRA on the day
the sample was drawn (July 23, 2010), found that none included expiration
dates.62 All of these rules were designed to establish ongoing programs,
standards, or policies. None were set up to self-destruct a fixed time period
after going into effect. (Six of them have additional ammunition against
perpetual delay, in that—according to OIRA—Congress or the courts have
provided a deadline by which the agency must regulate.)
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate what might happen to the NPV of an ongoing,
lifesaving regulation under differential discounting when the regulation is
delayed one year. For this hypothetical regulation, costs are $10M, $8M,
$5M, and $2M in the first four years, respectively, and $1M each
subsequent year. Benefits are $0.50M, $1.0M, and $1.5M in the first four
years, respectively, and $2M each subsequent year. In Table 1, costs are
discounted at a 3% rate, while benefits are not discounted at all; in Table 2,
costs are again discounted at a 3% rate, but benefits are discounted at a rate
of 1.5%.

62

Following are all of the regulations (arranged by agency and RIN) under EO 12866
review at OIRA on July 23, 2010, according to www.reginfo.gov. Department of
Agriculture: RIN 0583-AD36; Department of Defense: RIN 0720-AB45, RIN 0790-AI50;
Department of Health and Human Services: RIN 0920-AA12, RIN 0920-AA22,
RIN 0938-AP57; Department of Homeland Security: RIN 1651-AA83; Department of
Justice: RIN 1190-AA44, RIN 1190-AA46; Department of Labor: RIN 1210-AB07;
Department of Transportation: RIN 2125-AF19,RIN 2130-AC03; Department of Veterans
Affairs: RIN 2900-AN54; Environmental Protection Agency: RIN 2060-AQ13, RIN 2060AO15.
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Table 1: Immediate Implementation of Rule vs. Rule Delayed One Year
(Costs Discounted at 3%, Undiscounted Benefits)
Immediate Implementation of Rule
(Millions)

Year

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
Total
Net Benefits

Undiscounted
Costs

$ 10.00
$ 8.00
$ 5.00
$ 2.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 33.06

Rule Delayed One Year
(Millions)

Costs in 2011
dollars
(r=3%)

Undiscounted
Benefits

Undiscounted
Costs

$ 10.00
$ 7.76
$ 4.70
$ 1.83
$ 0.89
$ 0.86
$ 0.83
$ 0.81
$ 0.78
$ 0.76
$ 0.74
$ 0.72
$ 0.69
$ 0.67
$ 0.65
$ 0.63
$ 0.61
$ 0.60
$ 0.58
$ 0.56
$ 0.54
$ 0.53
$ 0.51
$ 0.50
$ 0.48
$ 0.47
$ 0.45
$ 0.44
$ 0.43
$ 0.41
$ 0.40
$ 0.39
$ 0.38
$ 0.37
$ 0.36
$ 0.34
$ 0.33
$ 0.32
$ 0.31
$ 0.30
$ 43.94

$ 0.50
$ 1.00
$ 1.50
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 77.00

$$ 10.00
$ 8.00
$ 5.00
$ 2.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 32.67

Costs in
2011 dollars
(r=3%)

Undiscounted
Benefits

$$ 9.70
$ 7.53
$ 4.56
$ 1.77
$ 0.86
$ 0.83
$ 0.81
$ 0.78
$ 0.76
$ 0.74
$ 0.72
$ 0.69
$ 0.67
$ 0.65
$ 0.63
$ 0.61
$ 0.60
$ 0.58
$ 0.56
$ 0.54
$ 0.53
$ 0.51
$ 0.50
$ 0.48
$ 0.47
$ 0.45
$ 0.44
$ 0.43
$ 0.41
$ 0.40
$ 0.39
$ 0.38
$ 0.37
$ 0.36
$ 0.34
$ 0.33
$ 0.32
$ 0.31
$ 0.30
$ 42.33

$$ 0.50
$ 1.00
$ 1.50
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 75.00
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Table 2: Immediate Implementation of Rule vs. Rule Delayed One Year
(Benefits Discounted at 1.5%, Costs Discounted at 3%)
Immediate Implementation of Rule
(Millions)

Year

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
Total
Net Benefits

Undiscounted
Costs

$ 10.00
$ 8.00
$ 5.00
$ 2.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 13.58

Costs in
2011
dollars
(r=3%)

$ 10.00
$ 7.76
$ 4.70
$ 1.83
$ 0.89
$ 0.86
$ 0.83
$ 0.81
$ 0.78
$ 0.76
$ 0.74
$ 0.72
$ 0.69
$ 0.67
$ 0.65
$ 0.63
$ 0.61
$ 0.60
$ 0.58
$ 0.56
$ 0.54
$ 0.53
$ 0.51
$ 0.50
$ 0.48
$ 0.47
$ 0.45
$ 0.44
$ 0.43
$ 0.41
$ 0.40
$ 0.39
$ 0.38
$ 0.37
$ 0.36
$ 0.34
$ 0.33
$ 0.32
$ 0.31
$ 0.30
$ 43.94

Undiscounted
Benefits

$ 0.50
$ 1.00
$ 1.50
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00

Benefits
in 2011
dollars
(r=1.5%)

$ 0.50
$ 0.99
$ 1.46
$ 1.91
$ 1.88
$ 1.85
$ 1.83
$ 1.80
$ 1.77
$ 1.75
$ 1.72
$ 1.69
$ 1.67
$ 1.64
$ 1.62
$ 1.59
$ 1.57
$ 1.55
$ 1.52
$ 1.50
$ 1.48
$ 1.46
$ 1.43
$ 1.41
$ 1.39
$ 1.37
$ 1.35
$ 1.33
$ 1.31
$ 1.29
$ 1.27
$ 1.25
$ 1.23
$ 1.21
$ 1.20
$ 1.18
$ 1.16
$ 1.14
$ 1.13
$ 1.11
$ 57.52

Rule Delayed One Year
(Millions)
Undiscounted
Costs

$$ 10.00
$ 8.00
$ 5.00
$ 2.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 1.00
$ 13.23

Costs in
2011
dollars
(r=3%)

$$ 9.70
$ 7.53
$ 4.56
$ 1.77
$ 0.86
$ 0.83
$ 0.81
$ 0.78
$ 0.76
$ 0.74
$ 0.72
$ 0.69
$ 0.67
$ 0.65
$ 0.63
$ 0.61
$ 0.60
$ 0.58
$ 0.56
$ 0.54
$ 0.53
$ 0.51
$ 0.50
$ 0.48
$ 0.47
$ 0.45
$ 0.44
$ 0.43
$ 0.41
$ 0.40
$ 0.39
$ 0.38
$ 0.37
$ 0.36
$ 0.34
$ 0.33
$ 0.32
$ 0.31
$ 0.30
$ 42.33

Undiscounted
Benefits

$$ 0.50
$ 1.00
$ 1.50
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 2.00

Benefits
in 2011
dollars
(r=1.5%)

$$ 0.49
$ 0.97
$ 1.43
$ 1.88
$ 1.85
$ 1.83
$ 1.80
$ 1.77
$ 1.75
$ 1.72
$ 1.69
$ 1.67
$ 1.64
$ 1.62
$ 1.59
$ 1.57
$ 1.55
$ 1.52
$ 1.50
$ 1.48
$ 1.46
$ 1.43
$ 1.41
$ 1.39
$ 1.37
$ 1.35
$ 1.33
$ 1.31
$ 1.29
$ 1.27
$ 1.25
$ 1.23
$ 1.21
$ 1.20
$ 1.18
$ 1.16
$ 1.14
$ 1.13
$ 1.11
$ 55.56
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As these tables show, delaying this hypothetical lifesaving regulation
by one year would reduce—not increase—net benefits when benefits are
discounted at 0% (Table 1) or 1.5% (Table 2) and monetary costs are
discounted at the higher rate of 3%. Differential discounting, once again,
does not point to a delay. When benefits are discounted at 0% (Table 1),
delaying the regulation by one year will eliminate an entire year of
undiscounted benefits at the stabilized amount of $2 million. When benefits
are discounted at 1.5% (Table 2), delaying the regulation one year will
eliminate $1.97 million in benefits. In both Table 1 and Table 2, costs,
discounted at the 3% annual rate, are reduced by only $1.61 million when
the rule is delayed a year—not enough, in either case, to compensate for the
benefits foregone when the rule is delayed. Thus, examined now over a
finite time horizon, the claim that, when costs are discounted at a higher
rate than benefits, postponing regulations will always yield higher net
benefits, still does not hold up.
Observe that for this hypothetical regulation, where costs and benefits
stabilize over time, the costs and benefits will be the same under either the
“regulate now” scenario or the “regulate in one year” scenario for most of
the years the regulation will be in effect. In Tables 1 and 2, the benefits and
costs each year after the first five years—once the startup costs have been
covered and costs and benefits have stabilized—are exactly the same. For
the sake of space, these tables only show costs and benefits up to the year
2050. When benefits are discounted at 0% (Table 1), for any point between
2015 and infinity, the NPV of the “regulate now” option will always be
$390,00063 more than the “regulate in one year” option. And when benefits
are discounted at 1.5%, the NPV of the “regulate now” option will always
be $350,00064 more than the “regulate in one year” option, from 2016
onward. No matter what end date is used in either of these CBAs, delaying
the regulation will never increase net benefits.
It is possible to conceive of a regulation with high enough upfront costs
and low enough upfront benefits that net benefits will be higher under
differential discounting if the rule is delayed, especially if a high discount
rate is used for costs. Such rules would tend to fail a conventional costbenefit test that uses equal discounting, but it is possible that some might
have positive net benefits under differential discounting. So, it is possible
that, under differential discounting, a finite delay might maximize net
benefits in some cases. This can happen under equal discounting, too, and
this is one reason agencies sometimes compare the net benefits of a
regulation under different start dates.65 That is, earliest implementation
63

This number is approximate, due to rounding.
This number is approximate, due to rounding.
65
E.g., NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS, ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL SYSTEMS, at VII3–VII9 (March
2007).
64
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doesn’t always maximize net benefits under either equal or differential
discounting. However, cost-beneficial rules would not be infinitely delayed.
For any rule that will have net benefits at any discrete point in time, and for
which ongoing annual benefits will eventually exceed ongoing annual
costs, it is possible that a finite delay may increase net benefits; however,
since costs are discounted at a higher rate than benefits, the benefits that are
foregone by delaying the rule will eventually be greater than the value of
postponing the costs an additional year. Any delay will not be infinite.
Choosing a fixed-length appraisal period (e.g., ten years from the date
the regulation will first generate costs and benefits) to compare the
“regulate now” option with the “regulate next year” option would create a
false impression that by delaying the regulation one year, one could
typically66 increase its net benefits under differential discounting.
66

But not “always.” The principal object of this Part has been to demonstrate that the
“perpetual delay” phenomenon observed by Keeler and Cretin absolutely disappears when
one assumes (contrary to Keeler and Cretin) that a year of regulatory delay means one
fewer year the regulation will generate regulatory costs and benefits. However, it is also
worth addressing John Graham’s very broad claim that, due to the operation of the KeelerCretin paradox, discounting benefits at a lower rate than costs would “always” point
decision makers toward perpetual delay of cost-beneficial regulations, as—even if all
relevant Keeler-Cretin assumptions are accepted—Graham has overstated the case. If we
apply all the relevant Keeler-Cretin assumptions to CBA (Keeler and Cretin worked in
cost-effectiveness analysis), and we assume a fixed-length program with exactly n years of
costs and benefits, and
is the annual discount rate for benefits, and
is the annual
discount rate for costs, then:
(
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where B0 and C0 are the costs and benefits this year, and B1 and C1 are the costs and
benefits next year, and so on. If we assume, like Keeler and Cretin, that delaying the
program a year will result in exactly the same annual costs and benefits, each delayed
exactly one year, then:
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(
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(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)
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Running regulations with various cost and benefit profiles (rising, falling, static) through
these equations, one finds that in cost-benefit analysis (as with cost-effectiveness analysis),
when benefits are discounted at a lower rate than costs, delaying the program does not
“always” increase the program’s present value, even when all Keeler-Cretin assumptions
are accepted. (Programs with falling benefits and/or programs with rising costs are
particularly likely to become less valuable under differential discounting if they are
delayed a year, under the Keeler and Cretin assumptions.) While the number of regulations
for which differential discounting would not point to perpetual delay, under Keeler and
Cretin’s highly unrealistic assumptions, may be quite small, that some regulations are
theoretically immune does at least contradict Graham’s broad claim that, due to the
operation of the Keeler-Cretin paradox, if costs are discounted at a lower rate than
benefits, a program will “always” appear more cost-beneficial if it is delayed. See also
Gravelle & Smith, supra note 46, at 592–93 (Gravelle and Smith assume a single period
project that will be undertaken once only (note that Keeler and Cretin do not specify a
“single period” project, although they do assume a project that will last a finite period of
time), and that the costs and health effects are the same no matter when the project is
undertaken; their analysis shows there are some circumstances, under these assumptions,
when CBA with differential discounting will not point to a delay).

)
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Generally, a regulation establishes a continuous policy or program, and the
date when the regulation will stop generating costs and benefits is not
determined by the effective date of the regulation. Thus, when using CBA
to compare net benefits for different effective dates for the same regulation,
it is inaccurate and misleading to assume that delaying the regulation will
affect neither its undiscounted benefits nor its undiscounted costs. This
assumption—necessary to obtain Keeler and Cretin’s paradoxical result—
that delaying a beneficial regulation will postpone but not otherwise
diminish its benefits and costs, is far less likely, at least in the context of
agency cost-benefit analysis, than the assumption that delaying the rule a
year will mean one fewer year that the regulation will be in effect.
Note that if the regulation were expected to generate costs and benefits
indefinitely, then to capture all, or almost all, of the effects of the
regulation, the cost-benefit analysis using the 1.5% discount rate for
benefits would have to extend for many additional years. Over an infinite
time horizon, net benefits of the rule will approach $76.55 million if it goes
into effect in 2011 and will approach $76.19 million if it goes into effect in
2012. Table 1, which uses a 0% rate for benefits, obviously does not
capture most of the effects of the ongoing, lifesaving regulation, and
extending the analysis for additional years would not help, since the value
of the uncaptured benefits will always be infinitely large, unless an
estimated date is identified when the regulation will stop generating
benefits.
But the purpose of this part is not to defend the use of a 0% rate for
benefits. 67 While there is a strong case to be made that any discounting of
public health and environmental goods in a conventional cost-benefit
analysis is inappropriate and unethical, these arguments are generally
bound up with the (also strong) case against using conventional cost-benefit
analysis as a decision-making tool at all. 68 Instead, the principal aim of this
part has been to establish that fear of running afoul of the “Keeler-Cretin
paradox” is not a valid reason for OMB to prohibit or discourage
differential discounting in agency CBAs.

67

Note, however, that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about arguing the
monetized values of some resources are increasing such that a negative discount rate
would be needed to accurately project the value of the resource into the future. A good
example of this might be an unpolluted aquifer, if water pollution is expected to increase
and unpolluted water is expected to become significantly scarcer. If CBA cannot
adequately assess regulations that protect resources whose value is expected to increase
very dramatically over time, this would seem to be an indictment of CBA, and not an
indictment of the use of negative (or zero) discount rates.
68
See Joseph H. Guth, Resolving the Paradoxes of Discounting in Environmental
Decisions, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (2009).
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D. THE TIME-INCONSISTENCY PARADOX
Another common argument against using a lower discount rate for
health benefits is the so-called “time-inconsistency paradox”—i.e.,
differential discounting would violate the assumption that, over time, the
“optimal tradeoff between wealth and health” will remain constant.69 But
since, as discussed below, the monetized values of health benefits are
expected to grow over time, and the public is expected to become willing to
expend more units of “wealth” for the same units of “health,” the
assumption is wrong anyway, and abandoning it will lead to more accurate
analyses than wrongly assuming static monetized values for health benefits.
II. OPPORTUNITY COST RATIONALES FOR EQUAL DISCOUNTING
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood…70
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.71

The concept of “opportunity cost” recognizes that with every human
decision comes an often-hidden cost, the loss of the opportunity to take
another (possibly better) course of action. For example, imagine I have
$10,000 available to invest for exactly one year (at which point I will need
to put the money toward a down payment on a house). I may be
considering investing in a mutual fund I expect will appreciate at an annual
rate of 6%. Another option might be a CD with a 3% annual interest rate.
Assume—for the sake of simplicity—these are the only investment options
available to me, besides the option of not investing. In this case, the
opportunity cost of investing in the CD is $600 (the money I could have
earned investing in the mutual fund, the next-best option), while the
opportunity cost of investing in the mutual fund is $300 (the money I could
have earned investing in the CD). A choice to invest in the CD would
certainly seem like a bad decision, since I can expect to earn twice as much
by investing in the mutual fund. More formally, the opportunity cost of
investing in the CD ($600) exceeds the benefit of investing in the CD
($300), and so, a decision to invest in the CD seems, prima facie, irrational.
But what if something constrains me from making the optimal
investment? What if, for some reason, I cannot buy the mutual fund
(although, perhaps, others still can)? Should I still refrain from buying the
CD? Is the “opportunity cost” of buying the CD still $600, or $300 more
than I will earn with the CD? Should I leave my money under my mattress
if I cannot buy the mutual fund, under the economic theory that one should
69

Graham, supra note 27, at 504–05.
Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in ROBERT FROST’S POEMS 219 (Louis
Untermeyer ed., 2002) (1915).
71
RUSH, FREEWILL (Mercury Records 1980) (lyrics by Neil Peart).
70
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not take any action for which the opportunity cost exceeds the expected
benefits?
The answer, of course, is that I should buy the CD. The value of some
better investment outcome not actually available for the decision maker to
choose is, as a definitional matter, not an opportunity cost. If I can’t buy the
mutual fund, I am still better off earning $300 with the CD than I would be
leaving the money under my mattress.
Note that the choice of doing nothing carries with it an opportunity cost
as well. The opportunity cost of leaving the money under my mattress is
$600 (if the mutual fund option is available to me) or $300 (if it is not),
while the benefit of not investing is $0. In other words, under either
scenario, taking no action appears to be an irrational choice, because the
benefits ($0) will be less than the opportunity cost ($600 or $300). Under
either scenario, taking no action is the worst option.
A failure to apprehend these simple concepts—that the relevant
opportunity cost is the expected value of the next-best alternative the
decision maker can actually elect (or rationally expects to occur if she fails
to make an election), and that “holding out” for a theoretically better but
actually unavailable option carries with it an opportunity cost of its own—
lies at the heart of the opportunity cost arguments for equal discounting.
Some definitions of opportunity cost are explicit on the point that the
opportunity cost of any course of action is the next-best option a decision
maker could have chosen. 72 While other definitions are not explicit on this
point (the following definition is typical: “Opportunity cost is the value of
the best alternative foregone in making any choice”73), it is implicit that the
relevant next-best alternative to a given choice must be another alternative
that the decision maker actually has the ability to select. Otherwise, and if
the opportunity cost of agency action or inaction were assessed without
regard for which outcomes the relevant agency can actually effectuate with
its choice, the concept would be completely rootless. 74
Misunderstanding the “opportunity cost” of regulatory actions in this
way, without reference to the set of outcomes actually available for the
72

See, e.g., THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, VOL. 3, 719 (John
Eatwell et al., eds. 1987); see also Minn. Power and Light v. Hockett, 105 F. Supp. 2d
939, 943 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that, to demonstrate eligibility to recover economic
opportunity costs from a plaintiff who obtained a preliminary injunction that was later
overturned, the defendant “must show that the preliminary injunction prohibited him from
engaging in profitable activities” that his existing contracts with others permitted, and “in
which he desired and had the wherewithal to engage.”).
73
TIMOTHY TREGARTHEN & LIBBY RITTENBERG, MICROECONOMICS 5 (2000); see also
City of Los Angeles v. U.S. Dep’t of Trans., 165 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir 1999) (quoting PAUL
A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 128 (16th ed. 1998) (“A leading
economics text defines ‘opportunity cost’ in this way: ‘Making a choice in effect costs us
the opportunity to do something else. The alternative forgone is called the opportunity
cost. . . .’”)).
74
See EATWELL ET AL., supra note 72, at 718–20.
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agency decision maker to effectuate, makes it worse than useless as a
decision criterion. When the best action actually available is worse than the
best action theoretically available under unrealistic assumptions, 75 agencies
may often be taking no action when they should be regulating to protect
public health and/or the environment.
Although the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually
displaced by regulations are relevant considerations for regulators, the
arguments, premised in opportunity cost, that logic compels equal
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits, are incorrect. And, while
opportunity costs (including investment gains foregone) are economic
costs, using them as CBA cost inputs will often confound those analyses,
and—by essentially raising the baseline—prevent CBAs from measuring
what they are meant to measure. (Note that I am not arguing for or against
applying a discount rate derived from the “opportunity cost of capital” to
regulatory costs; that issue is analytically distinct from the issue of whether
the economic concept of opportunity cost logically requires equal
discounting of costs and benefits in CBAs.)
A. A RESPONSE TO OMB’S OPPORTUNITY COST ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL
DISCOUNTING
The OMB Guidelines provide: “It is true that lives saved today cannot
be invested in a bank to save more lives in the future. But the resources that
would have been used to save those lives can be invested to earn a higher
payoff in future lives saved.”76 Opportunity cost is not just used as a
rationale for some discounting of health and environmental benefits; it is
the primary positive rationale for equal discounting:
Investment theory states that any immediate cost represents a foregone
investment opportunity. If the immediate cost is deferred, the resulting
savings can be invested at a positive rate of return that is defined by the
expected inflation-adjusted (“real”) rate of interest in the economy. (The
inflation-adjusted rate of interest is also the real discount rate used by
analysts when transforming a future cost or benefit into present value).77

According to the OMB Guidelines, should a regulator choose not to
regulate, whatever would have been spent on the regulation could instead
be “invested to earn a higher payoff in future lives saved.” 78 All the
regulation’s social costs represent “foregone investment opportunities.”
But, again, at the heart of this argument lies a fundamental
75

Cf. A.K. Sen, Shadow Prices and Markets: Feasibility Constraints, in RICHARD
LAYARD & STEPHEN GLAISTER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 102 (2nd ed. 1994) (“For a
project evaluator . . . it is important to know which variables are within his control and to
what extent, and in this respect a feeling of oneness with the totality of the government
may not be very useful.”).
76
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34.
77
Graham et al., supra note 28, at 990 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
78
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34.
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misunderstanding of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of an agency
action or inaction is the value of the next-best alternative that will actually
be foregone due to the agency’s action or inaction.
While the set of foregone alternatives for an agency economist to
consider does include the “do nothing” option, of course,79 it does not—as
many commentators have pointed out—include the option of taking the
money that would have been spent on regulatory compliance and investing
it on the public’s behalf. 80 And even if such an option were available to the
agency, this still would not justify equal discounting, since (as is explained
below), for many regulations the amount by which the benefits figure is
reduced in the CBA to account for the “opportunity cost” of foregone
investment is actually greater than the amount that would be gained if all
regulatory costs were invested at the discount rate. Since public health and
environmental regulations are generally directed at market failures, 81 large
jumps in social welfare as a consequence of regulation should not confound
the analysis in this way.
The opportunity cost argument for equal discounting also errs in its
assumption that the value of the “next best” alternative should always be
included as a cost input in CBA (if fully operationalized, this policy would
result in some enormously beneficial regulations being assessed as having
“net benefits” of only a penny), and it errs in assuming that, by using CBA
to make decisions, one could maximize two distinct variables at once.
1. Analysts conducting CBAs cannot simultaneously maximize both
“net benefits” and the total number of lives saved
In making the case for equal discounting, the OMB Guidelines make
two claims that are fundamentally incompatible, and that are each
individually incorrect. The first claim is that equal discounting in CBAs
will result in more lifesaving. The second is that equal discounting in CBAs
will increase social welfare. 82
The two claims are incompatible with each other, as “it is not
mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the
same time.”83 We cannot make a decision that maximizes “net benefits” (as
calculated in a CBA), whilst simultaneously maximizing a different and
distinct variable, the total number of lives saved in society.
It is easy to see how CBA’s promoters were drawn to arguments that
CBA (including the controversial equal discounting requirement) will
maximize not just “net benefits,” but also “lifesaving” (for, if so, CBA’s
79

Unless the agency is constrained by a statute or court order.
See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 9, at 34–35; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108
YALE LAW J. 1911, 1912 n. 4 (1999).
81
See infra note 100.
82
Or one of its economic proxies, “net benefits” or “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.” See
discussion infra Part I.A.3.a.
83
Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
80
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detractors are making utterly perverse policy arguments—they wish to save
fewer lives and reduce net social welfare, all, apparently, for the sake of
clinging to irrational, absolutist values). But the claim that equal
discounting in CBA will enable regulators to both maximize some
economic measure of welfare and maximize the total number of lives saved
defies logic. In fact, this application of equal discounting will not maximize
either variable.
2. The claim that equal discounting will maximize the total number
of lives saved fails
The “lifesaving” argument may be attempting to persuade a readership
that includes CBA skeptics who would find arguments that reduce to
“equal discounting will maximize social welfare” unpersuasive. (To some,
a decision that maximizes social welfare may be less attractive than a
decision that doesn’t, if, for example, most of the social welfare gains
would inure to the benefit of healthy billionaires, and if some vulnerable
people would experience welfare losses.)
It might make sense in the abstract to say that, instead of spending
resources on a certain regulation, society as a collective unit could choose
instead to invest those resources in mutual funds and buy more "lifesaving
benefits" later. However, when we are talking about an actual agency
decision-maker (and, in the case of any policy reviewed by OIRA, we
always are), in general, the “next best” alternative to regulating is leaving
the funds that would have been spent on compliance in the control of
regulated industry and any other regulatory payors. Agencies are not
empowered to tax, and neither may they direct the regulatory payors to take
the money that would otherwise have been spent on the regulation and
invest it for future lifesaving.84 If there is no actual “opportunity” for the
agency to cause the projected compliance costs to be invested in alternative
future lifesaving, then this is not truly an “opportunity cost” of a decision to
regulate.
In general, the biggest regulatory payors are actors that seek to
maximize profits. A firm that doesn’t have to buy a better scrubber for its
smokestack is not going to invest the money it would have spent on the
scrubber in a special account for future lifesaving. If agencies are unable to
compel this behavior, and if a rational firm would not make this investment
on its own, then to say an agency must determine before regulating whether
one could theoretically save more lives in the future by investing the
projected regulatory costs at current rates of return on investments is
ridiculous. The agency simply lacks the power—by regulating or by
forbearing to regulate—to cause this investment to occur, or to even make
it more likely to occur.85
84
85

Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1912.
See id.
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3. The claim that the across-the-board equal discounting mandate
serves to increase social welfare (or its proxy, “net benefits”) also
fails
a. The projected investment gains of the next-best alternative to
a regulation is not necessarily an appropriate CBA cost input
Opportunity costs (assuming they do represent actual forgone
opportunities) are real economic costs, to be sure. However, some
opportunity costs should not be used as cost inputs in CBAs. Understanding
why requires some understanding of the theory that underlies cost-benefit
analysis.
At its most ambitious and theoretical, costs-benefit analysis attempts to
maximize total social welfare. It has its roots in the work of Wilfred Pareto,
who postulated that “[a]n economic change is desirable if in the new
situation at least one individual is better off and no individual is worse
off.”86 Such an economic change is referred to as a “Pareto improvement.”
Building on Pareto’s work, economists like Nicholas Kaldor and John
Hicks theorized that a policy could be socially beneficial—more
“efficient,” even—if it has the effect of making one set of people better off
and another set worse off, so long as the winners could theoretically
compensate the losers; this type of change is sometimes referred to as a
“potential Pareto improvement.”87
Cost-benefit analysis effectuates the Kaldor-Hicks principle that such
potential Pareto improvements are social “benefits” regardless of who wins
and who loses. If the sum of everyone’s individual utilities before the
change is less than the sum of everyone’s individual utilities after the
change, the change will be said to have had a net social benefit. Everyone’s
utilities are given equal weight. The best choice, under CBA, is the one that
maximizes net benefits.
In its most sophisticated form, a CBA of a regulatory proposal
accurately estimates expected changes in “consumer surplus” 88 and
“producer surplus”89 for various effective dates and levels of regulatory
stringency, carefully identifies and quantifies any likely changes in
government revenue, and perhaps uses distributional weights to value
certain goods more (or less), depending on whether or not they are received
86

CAROLINE DINWIDDY & FRANCIS TEAL, PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 60 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
87
Id. at 66–67.
88
Consumer surplus means “the accumulated difference between the market price and
the price consumers would, at a maximum, have accepted to pay for the products
purchased.” MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 87 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2003).
89
“Producer surplus” refers to the excess amount “producers receive above and beyond
the minimum prices that would have been required to get them to produce and sell their
output.” EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 325 (W.W. Norton & Co.,
11th ed. 2003).
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or spent by populations who derive more (or less) utility from the relevant
goods. The analyst ultimately arrives at a policy that maximizes social
welfare (or “net benefits” or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—all of these terms
are used to mean essentially the same thing, in the CBA context.) But these
very sophisticated, complete CBAs tend to reside mostly, if not entirely, in
textbooks.
As Table 3, below, illustrates, real-world agency CBAs bear little
resemblance to what one might expect from studying high-theory welfare
economics textbooks. Once completed, even a comparatively sophisticated
real-world analysis that cost an agency tens of thousands of dollars will
ultimately generate (in addition to certain narrative and cost-effectiveness
information) “bottom line” summaries like the following, which estimates
net benefits for EPA’s favored proposed rule on new source performance
standards and emissions guidelines for sewage sludge incineration units. 90
Even though not all benefits in Table 3 are monetized and included in
the “net benefits” figure; even though the analysis does not purport to
capture costs and benefits over the whole lifespan of the regulation; even
though this analysis is undoubtedly flawed, still, there is no doubt that it is
attempting to measure the change in societal benefits that will result from
the regulation.

90

The final regulation that was ultimately issued by EPA is similar, but not identical to,
the proposal considered in the analysis summarized in Table 3. See Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for
Existing Sources: Sewage Sludge Incineration Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 15372, 15380–82
(March 21, 2011).
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Table 3: Summary of Estimated Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits for the
Year 2015, in 2008 Dollars, for an EPA Proposed Regulation for Sewage
Sludge Incinerators 91

Total Public Health and Environmental
Benefits92
Estimated “Annualized” Compliance
Costs93
Net Benefits for the Year 2015

3% Discount
Rate
$130M $310M

7% Discount
Rate
$120M $290M

92M94

92M

$37 - $220

$26 - $190

Additional environmental benefits not
monetized and not accounted for in the “net
benefits” figures:
26,000 tons of carbon monoxide
96 tons of HCl
5,500 pounds of mercury
1.6 tons of cadmium
3.0 tons of lead
90 grams of dioxins/furans
Health effects from reduced NO2 and SO2
exposure

Assume, now, that the EPA has extremely wide discretion regarding
precise effective dates and levels of stringency. In that case, even if the
91

This table is adapted from RTI INT’L, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: STANDARDS
STATIONARY SOURCES AND EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR
SLUDGE INCINERATION UNITS 1–3 (September 2010)
(Prepared for EPA). (Similar charts were presented for two additional regulatory
alternatives. Id.) The RIA is available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDe
tail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0559-0042.
92
Note that this figure includes a small amount of “disbenefits,” i.e., health costs that
will result from the extra fuel consumption necessitated by the rule. Id. at 1–3. If
differential discounting were operationalized, this type of accounting is a way agencies
might apply the same discount rate to health benefits as to health costs.
93
The regulatory impact analysis presents this data as the rule’s “total social costs,” but
immediately clarifies that: “The annual compliances [sic] costs serve as a proxy for the
annual social costs of this rule given the lack of difference between the two.” Id. (The
negative health effects of the regulation are accounted for in the benefits figure, as
“disbenefits.”)
94
“Annualized” compliance costs were estimated to be $92M in 2008 dollars for the
year 2015 (compliance costs appear to have been annualized over a period of fifteen years,
so the costs for 2015 will include capital costs incurred earlier). See id. at 3-5 and C-33.
Earlier in the analysis, it is explained that “Costs are on a 2008 basis, and annualized costs
assumed an interest rate of 7 percent.” Id. at 3-3. It is interesting that the EPA appears here
to have engaged in a form of differential discounting when it subtracted annualized costs,
discounted at 7%, from benefits discounted at 3%.
OF PERFORMANCE FOR NEW
EXISTING SOURCES: SEWAGE
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agency chooses the most cost-beneficial regulation possible, the “next-best
alternative” to that regulation might be a regulation that is almost exactly as
cost-beneficial as the option that was selected. The “next-best” alternative
might have net benefits that are only a penny less than the alternative with
the highest net benefits.
But this “opportunity cost” baseline is obviously the wrong baseline for
cost-benefit analysis. If a rule generates a billion dollars in net benefits
when compared to the status quo, pre-regulation world, then we wouldn’t
say that the net benefits of the rule are $0.01, even if an alternative version
of the regulation that was also available to the agency would have
generated only a penny less in net benefits (or would have had a rate of
return that was, say, less than a billionth of a percentage point lower).
The command not to take an action for which the opportunity costs are
greater than the expected benefits, and the command to maximize net
benefits will—if we are monetizing and discounting goods the same way
for both analyses—generate the same outcome. However, using
“opportunity costs” (such as forgone alternative rates of return on
“regulatory investment”) as cost inputs in a CBA may prevent the CBA
from measuring what it purports to measure. Instead of measuring net
benefits from a “status quo” baseline (or some other plausible baseline), the
analysis will measure net benefits from a “next best alternative” baseline.
This will make it impossible for policy makers to compare projects using
CBA: does a project with “net benefits” of a penny reflect an investment of
resources with a low rate of return, or does that low “net benefits” figure
merely reflect a high degree of rulemaking flexibility for the agency?
b. Even accepting the OMB Guidelines’ assumption that but for
the regulation all regulatory costs would be invested at a rate
equal to the discount rate, discounting all a regulation’s benefits
at the discount rate would still irrationally lower the net benefits
of cost-beneficial regulations
While there is, of course, an economic value associated with leaving the
money that would have been spent on regulation in the hands of regulated
industry (and in the hands of any others who would bear regulatory costs),
this is not a value that necessarily grows at some universal “expected
inflation-adjusted…rate of interest in the economy.”95
One might argue, for example, that even though a firm’s foregone
compliance costs will not be invested on the public’s behalf, this money
might be invested on the firm’s behalf, and the loss of that investment gain
to the firm should be considered an opportunity cost of regulating (after all,
we are attempting with CBA to quantify all the costs and benefits that
accrue to all segments of society as a result of regulation). But the act of
forbearing to regulate will not cause an affected firm to invest all the
95

Graham et al., supra note 28, at 990.
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foregone compliance costs on its own behalf, either, and any other
regulatory payors (for example, any negatively-affected employees or
customers) will not invest all of the regulatory costs foregone. Instead,
some of this money will simply be consumed, and not invested,96 and the
amount of actual averted investment (and the relevant rates of return) will
vary greatly across regulations.
One of the discount rates agencies must use in their cost-benefit
analyses is 7%. 97 (This is a “real” rate, meaning this rate is applied after
adjusting for inflation. Thus, if the annual rate of inflation is 2%, the
corresponding “nominal” discount rate—the discount rate that also adjusts
for inflation—is 9%.) Agencies applying the 7% real discount rate to
benefits under this opportunity cost theory assume that, in the absence of
regulation, the inflation-adjusted annual growth in value of the avoided
compliance costs would be 7%. It is incorrect, however, to assume that the
regulatory payors would invest the avoided compliance costs such that this
money would experience growth at this rate. If 7% is the firm’s return on
investment after adjusting for inflation, then achieving 7% annual growth
in the value of all the avoided compliance costs would require 100%
reinvestment by the firm, with zero consumption during the lifespan of the
proposed regulation. This is simply not a plausible assumption. 98
For regulations for which the costs, invested at the discount rate, would
not grow enough to exceed the expected benefits by the time the benefits
are to be realized (that is, for any regulation that passes CBA under equal
discounting), the problem is compounded. If all the foregone costs are
unlikely to be invested, it is still less likely that a larger sum of money—
i.e, the amount that would have to be invested at the discount rate in order
for the value of the investment to equal the value of the regulatory benefits
at the times they would have occurred—would be invested as a direct result
of a regulator’s decision not to regulate.
Returning to the smokestack example, assume the purpose of this
proposed pollution reduction measure is to internalize an externality. This
means the regulation will both reduce pollution and increase the firm’s
production costs, so that more of the public costs (or, the “negative
externalities”) of the firm’s activities will be absorbed (or, “internalized”)

96

See Shane Frederick, Valuing Future Life and Future Lives: A Framework for
Understanding Discounting, 27 J. OF ECON. PSYCH. 667, 671 (2006).
97
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34. The other
rate is 3%. Id.
98
Frederick, supra note 96, at 671. If the OMB’s 3% discount rate is premised in
opportunity cost, but is meant to reflect a partial investment at a higher rate of return, then
this should be made explicit. The 7% rate (the other rate called for by the OMB
guidelines), if it is premised in opportunity cost, cannot reflect much—if any—expected
short-term consumption.
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by the firm. Precisely because the firm is now bearing more of the costs of
its pollution, it can be expected to pollute at more efficient levels. 99
A decision not to regulate may provide measurable economic benefit to
the polluting firm, its investors, and perhaps to its customers and
employees; however, because the firm is engaging in activity (polluting)
that causes a deadweight loss100 to society (as uninternalized negative
externalities always do),101 these benefits come as part of a package that, on
balance, likely reduces social welfare, the loss of which cannot necessarily
be made up for by merely investing some sum of money that will be
expected to grow at the discount rate.
To take a stark example, imagine that an agency is considering a
regulation with an immediate cost of $100 (and no other costs), which
would produce health benefits in 20 years that will have a monetized value
of approximately $100,000 (in constant 2011 dollars) at that time. If that
initial $100 were immediately invested at a 7% interest rate, it would still
be worth less than $400 after 20 years. It makes no sense to say that the
present value of that $100,000 in regulatory benefits is only $62,000
because, instead of funding the regulation, the initial $100 in costs could
have been invested at market rates of return! 102
A key distinction between agency decisions and most private, financial
investment decisions is that regulators don’t necessarily have a panoply of
options before them that is analogous to the selection that a private investor
would likely enjoy. Among real agency alternatives, there may be no
option that saves just one life more or fewer. Hypothetically, if OSHA were
determining whether workers on low, 10-foot to15-foot aerial lifts should
be required to wear full-body harnesses, there would most likely be a
certain amount of discretion left to the agency; however, the agency must
make some “investment” decisions for which there are no gradations at the
margins. In the world of finance, it is generally possible to make gradated
investment decisions. However, regulatory agencies may have to make
binary, yes/no decisions that have large economic consequences. For
99

RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 527–33
(2004).
100
In economics, “deadweight loss” is a social cost incurred when the market
equilibrium, which sets the price of a commodity, does not reflect the socially optimum
price point. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 89, at 330. This may occur when market
failures, such as negative externalities and monopolies, affect the market equilibrium. See
id.; see also FAURE & SKOGH, supra note 88, at 94–98.
101
See JUST ET AL., supra note 99, at 529.
102
Of course, if the benefits to be received in 20 years would have taken the form of
actual money, and not health benefits, and if 7% is the correct discount rate for that
money—if the recipient would be indifferent between receiving $62,000 now and
$100,000 in 20 years—then those benefits may indeed be worth only $62,000 today. But
the time value of the ultimate monetary benefit to its beneficiary has absolutely nothing to
do with the value of the next-best regulation (or other investment) that was foregone when
this regulation with $100 in social costs was chosen by the regulator.
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practical or legal reasons, there may be a very large difference between the
net benefits of a proposed regulation and the net benefits of its next-best
available alternative.
The decision to discount all regulatory benefits at the rate of return
foregone for regulatory costs seems to assume: (1) that there is likely an
alternative investment for those costs that would have a rate of return
approximately the same as the rate of return of the regulatory option being
evaluated; and (2) that those opportunity costs are cost inputs that should be
included in the CBA. Neither assumption is necessarily correct.
B. A RESPONSE TO THE SUNSTEIN/ROWELL ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL
DISCOUNTING
In an interesting paper that defends the OMB’s equal discounting
requirement, Sunstein and Rowell acknowledge that the OMB Guidelines’
“brisk” reference to opportunity costs might not provide a sufficient basis
for equal discounting. 103 (They also acknowledge that, in the future, we
may be willing to pay more to save lives, and so the “value of a statistical
life” may be growing over time—see discussion infra Part III.B.) Sunstein
and Rowell attempt to separate the issue of discounting’s logic from the
issue of discounting’s ethics, and argue that logic compels that monetized
health benefits be discounted. The resulting ethical problem (how to ensure
that the present strikes the right balance between protecting its interests and
protecting the interests of the future, when discounting can so dramatically
lower the apparent value of current regulations whose benefits accrue to the
future) must therefore be addressed through some method other than
refusing to apply the “appropriate discount rate for money” 104 to health and
environmental goods.
According to Sunstein and Rowell:
If the issue is how much people now living will be willing to pay in
twenty years to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, the resulting amount must
be subject to the appropriate discount rate for money—and hence a VSL
[value of a statistical life] of $10 million, if that is the appropriate amount
in twenty years, must be discounted too. The reason has nothing to do
with discounting life or health; it is that a sum of money in the future is
worth less than the same sum today. Recall that any particular dollar
amount in twenty years is worth some fraction of that figure now not for
any exotic or theoretically contentious reason, but because the fraction can
be invested and made to grow. 105

Sunstein and Rowell argue that it is not lives per se that are being
discounted. Instead, they argue, we are only ever discounting dollars. If the
life being saved in twenty years will have a monetized value of $10 million
at that time, then the present value of saving that life is $5.54 million (at a
103
104
105

See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 177, 181.
Id. at 186.
Id.
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3% discount rate) or $2.58 million (at a 7% rate), because that’s how much
a guarantee of $10 million of actual money in twenty years is worth now.
“So long as valuations are based on private willingness to pay, there is no
special problem with discounting money; any objection is to the use of
willingness to pay, not to discounting as such.” 106
1. There is no single discount rate that inheres in money, qua
money; costs and benefits can easily be expressed in the same units
and then discounted at different rates
There exists no “appropriate discount rate for money,” qua money;
there is no single discount rate that inheres in all units of this good, even at
a single point in time in a single economy. For example, outside of the
CBA context, OMB has explained:
Some Federal activities provide a mix of both Federal cost savings and
external social benefits. For example, Federal investments in information
technology can produce Federal savings in the form of lower
administrative costs and external social benefits in the form of faster
claims processing. The net present value of such investments should be
evaluated with the 7 percent real discount rate[…]unless the analysis is
able to allocate the investment's costs between provision of Federal cost
savings and external social benefits. Where such an allocation is possible,
Federal cost savings and their associated investment costs may be
discounted at the Treasury rate, while the external social benefits and their
associated investment costs should be discounted at the 7 percent real
rate.107

Even assuming that monetization of extramarket intangibles through
willingness to pay does generate dollar figures that should be treated like
“any other money”108 (and I argue below that it does not), as the above
OMB quote shows, there is no one rate that is appropriate for all money.
So, the mere monetizing of an extramarket good, in and of itself, cannot
establish what its discount rate should be. (While the OMB Guidelines now
demand that all goods be discounted using equal discounting at both 7%
and 3%, with a “net benefits” figure calculated under each rate,109 this is
not because either figure is necessarily the appropriate rate for money, qua
money.)
Thus, even if every cost and benefit itemized in a CBA were an actual
monetary cost or benefit, it still would not follow that all benefits and costs
should presumptively be discounted at identical rates.
106

Id. at 174. See also Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1912 (“Money is discounted
precisely because tomorrow’s dollar is worth less than today’s. If life is equivalent to
money, its value must also decline with time.”).
107
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-94 (1992), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094#8.
108
Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of
Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1514 (2010).
109
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34.
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2. CBA arguably does require monetization of goods that are
arguably incommensurable with money; still, some special handling
of “incommensurables” is both economically sound and ethically
preferable to treating these goods—once monetized—exactly like
market commodities
This paper focuses on CBA, but it is worth noting, as an aside, that the
cost-effectiveness analyses that agencies submit to Sunstein’s OIRA
directly discount the values of future lives, qua lives.110 Whatever justifies
discounting of those lives, it cannot be the fact that the discounting is
merely being done to a “sum of money,” since those lives are discounted
directly, such that any lives that aren’t saved immediately are only worth a
fraction of a life.
While it may be technically true that cost-benefit analysts apply
discount rates to dollar amounts, and not directly to human lives (because a
cost-benefit analyst converts the value of the life into dollars and then
discounts the dollars), these analysts nevertheless diminish the present
value of those lives just as surely as their counterparts who practice costeffectiveness analysis.
In CBA, unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, all costs and benefits must
be expressed in the same units. Theoretically, this base unit can be
anything; it does not have to be monetary. 111 It could be apples.112 It could
be salt. But the mere act of converting the original good into equivalent
units of the base good doesn’t cause the original good to take on all the
properties of the base good.
The mere act of expressing a regulation’s non-monetary benefits in
dollar equivalents does not cause the present value of those benefits to
diminish at a real rate of 7% per year any more than expressing a
regulation’s benefits in equivalent units of salt would cause those benefits
to become soluble in water. Put another way: we may know that in twenty
years we will be willing to pay $10 million to avoid a death that year, but
this fact alone does not tell us how much we will be willing to pay today
(or ten years from now) to avoid that death, and learning the appropriate
discount rate for that CBA’s cost inputs does not answer the question. To
find the present value of the averted death, we need to know the rate at
which our willingness-to-pay (WTP)113 values for this good are expected to
110

Oddly, the OMB currently recommends different, lower discount rates for use in costeffectiveness analyses, which is used to evaluate the very same regulations evaluated with
CBA. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-94, Appendix C (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094/a94_appx-c/.
111
See Mark Ellington, Numeraire Illusion: The Final Demise of the Kaldor-Hicks
Principle, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 96 (Mark D. White
ed., 2009).
112
Id.
113
Or our willingness-to-accept values, if that is the correct estimation technique for that
good in that context (see infra discussion of willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-
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change over time, because we are not just discounting a sum of money, we
are discounting the value of a particular illiquid and non-fungible good that
does not have all the characteristics of the base good, money, and so to
know its value at any point in time we need more information than just its
value at another point in time and the appropriate discount rate for
regulatory costs.114
According to Rowell:
If economic cost-benefit analysis has a claim to usefulness, it is because it
converts disparate goods into a single metric: money. Money can be
invested. This is one of its fundamental qualities. The practice of
discounting monetized benefits stems from this quality: removing that
characteristic from the mix means that we are no longer dealing with
money. Instead, we are comparing classic soda to diet soda—“money” to
something like “money lite,” which has some (but not all) of the qualities
of money. 115

Well . . . yes. Rowell’s analysis elucidates one of the fundamental problems
with adding monetized values of intangible goods—like saved lives—that
cannot be invested and are not fully commensurable with money, to a costbenefit equation.116 Non-fungible health and environmental goods simply
do not share all of money’s fundamental qualities, and this
incommensurability is indeed a problem for the usefulness of cost-benefit
analysis.
Whether the monetized values for extramarket benefits were originally
derived through WTP or through some other method is irrelevant. Our mere
knowledge of the present, monetized value of a health benefit that will
occur at some specific, later point in time, along with our knowledge of the
appropriate discount rate(s) for the other inputs in the CBA, are insufficient
in and of themselves to tell us what the monetized value of that intangible
health benefit will be if it is to occur at any other point in time. Frustrating
though this may be for someone trying to produce a clean analysis, the

accept at Part III.B); however, the Sunstein & Rowell analysis assumes that all values for
intangible, non-monetary regulatory benefits will be derived through WTP estimates, and
that assumption is adopted here.
114
If we are willing to spend $7 million today to avoid exposing a child to a certainly
lethal carcinogen with a 20-year latency period, and if the willingness to pay to avoid such
a cancer case in twenty years, right before the cancer will become apparent, will be $10
million (controlling for inflation), we can conclude from this that the $7 million value the
present ascribes to saving that life is greater than the present value of the future’s
willingness to pay to save that life (because the present value using the future’s WTP is
only $5.54 million or $2.58 million, under the 3% and 7% rates, respectively)
(incidentally, this would create a difficulty—whose valuation should we use?). Or we can
simply conclude that the value of this regulatory benefit does not diminish at the same rate
as monetary benefits as the benefits are delayed.
115
Rowell, supra note 108, at 1516.
116
See Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996).
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mere monetizing of these extramarket goods is insufficient to cause them to
behave just like money.
Even in the context of CBAs, which arguably do demand monetization
of all goods that are to be represented in the ultimate net benefits figure, we
can set some limits on the extent to which we treat extramarket health and
environmental goods as if they possess all the attributes of ordinary market
commodities. Although I disagree with her conclusion, I find Rowell’s
insight about “money lite” extremely helpful to my understanding of how
monetized intangibles ought to be treated in a CBA. Even after
monetization, they ought to be treated as uninvestible; they ought to be
treated as “money lite.”
Given the way CBAs are already calculated, differential discounting
should be relatively easy to operationalize in many analyses. Real-world
CBAs generally list a limited set of monetized costs and benefits—which
are already itemized and discounted separately from one another—and
subtract the discounted costs from the discounted benefits to arrive at a net
benefits figure. (Economists and students of public policy who are
acquainted with “high theory” CBA might find many of these analyses
surprisingly crude.117)
3. Even if all benefits were investible, this would not justify an equal
discounting requirement
Assuming, arguendo, that all CBA inputs derived through WTP
estimations should be treated as investible, under the theory that
investability is an intrinsic characteristic of money, this fact alone would
not justify an across-the-board equal discounting mandate.
Sunstein and Rowell claim that once the values of lives saved are
monetized, they must be discounted because “a sum of money in the future
is worth less than the same sum today. Recall that any particular dollar
amount in twenty years is worth some fraction of that figure now not for
any exotic or theoretically contentious reason, but because the fraction can
be invested and made to grow.”118 This is the language of opportunity cost,
and this claim is similar to the standard opportunity cost argument
discussed in Part II.A., above. But while the OMB Guidelines justify equal
discounting based on the theoretical investability of all the regulatory costs,
Sunstein and Rowell seem to justify equal discounting based on the
theoretical investability of the benefits. But even if both costs and benefits

117

Much of this may be a result of the difficulty of obtaining the data needed for a
complete accounting of regulatory costs and benefits. See Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (stating that in the context of
hazardous air pollutants, “we find it unthinkable that science may ever yield absolute
certainty of safety in an area so complicated and replete with problems of measurement,
modeling, long latency, and the like[.]”).
118
Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 186.

2011]

THE CASE FOR DIFFERENTIAL DISCOUNTING

119

were investible, they might not both be investible at precisely the same
rates of return, and so equal discount rates may not appropriate.
Assuming the regulatory benefits in question are investible—assuming,
even, that they will take the form of actual money—that fact alone cannot
establish that identical discount rates must apply to the costs and the
benefits. If the winners and the losers have very different constraints and
very different investment opportunities, they might reveal very different
present values for identical guarantees of future money. While it might be
convenient to assign equal rates to all monetary sums that enter a CBA, this
policy is in no sense compelled by logic.
C. AN “OPPORTUNITY COST PARALYZING PARADOX,” AND WHY IT IS
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF DIFFERENTIAL DISCOUNTING
The standard opportunity cost rationale for discounting, discussed in
Subpart A, is often combined with an assumption that the inflation-adjusted
cost of lifesaving will never change, leading commentators to conclude that
even when, after equal discounting, the present value of the benefits of
regulating now are less than the present value of the costs of regulating
now (that is, even if regulating now would be cost-beneficial under equal
discounting), it may still make sense to delay regulation to achieve the
maximum possible lifesaving benefit:
While human lives are priceless from a philosophical or religious
perspective, the resources that can be used to save lives are limited. If we
fail to recognize this economic reality as we go about the process of
choosing regulations, we will expend resources in a way that prevents us
from saving as many lives as possible. It is not the idea that future lives
are less valuable in any moral or ethical sense that leads to the process of
discounting at a current rate of interest. Rather, discounting is appropriate
in that, if invested, our resources are expected to grow at that rate, so that
if we forego spending and invest the money instead, we can save more
lives in the future with the amount foregone today.119
The central rationale for discounting future lifesaving is the opportunity
cost of investing resources now—since lifesaving may not occur for many
years, or possibly decades. If instead of expending $1 billion today to save
1000 lives ten years from now, we invest the $1 billion for ten years at a
3% real rate of interest, we will accumulate $1.34 billion to invest in
lifesaving (or other purposes) ten years from now. If the marginal
(inflation-adjusted) cost of saving lives is the same ten years from now as
it is today, investing the resources will enable us to save 1340 lives ten
years from now—340 more than we will save by making the immediate
lifesaving expenditure. 120

119

John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount
Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1905 (1999).
120
Graham, supra note 27, at 504.
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But why stop at only 1,340 lives? If Graham is right that “we” can
invest the resources that would have been spent on the regulation at a 3%
real rate, and if he is correct in his assumption that the marginal, inflationadjusted cost of saving lives is not increasing, then (with apologies to
Heinzerling, who has made a very similar point)121 we could save 19,219
lives by waiting 100 years. We could save 2,621,877,234 lives by waiting
500 years. Under the terms of the example above, rather than make a
current investment of $1 million per life to be saved ten years from now
(even at a 7% discount rate, and using the values for lives saved in current
use at the agencies, this proposal “passes” cost-benefit analysis in the sense
that its costs are less than its benefits, even after equal discounting), we
should not regulate if we could theoretically save more lives in the future
by investing our regulatory budget. However, the catch, under this set of
assumptions, is that it may always make sense to leave that budget
invested; under these constraints, we may never actually get around to
saving any of those lives.122 (And note that while Graham, in the quote
above, does not make it clear that the lives we are paying to save ten years
from the present will actually be saved ten years after the money is spent,
this is obviously true. Graham assumes that the marginal cost of lifesaving
is static; therefore, if it takes a current expenditure of $1 million to save a
life ten years from now, then in ten years it will cost $1 million to save a
life twenty years from now.)
This version of the opportunity cost argument compounds the error of
the opportunity cost argument discussed in Subpart A, above, by adding an
erroneous assumption that the marginal, inflation-adjusted cost of saving
lives is not increasing. But there is ample evidence that the marginal cost of
saving lives in the United States is growing faster than the rate of
inflation. 123
This opportunity cost-plus argument would generally prohibit current
investments in lifesaving whenever more lives could theoretically be saved
in the future, but two false assumptions—i.e., the cost of lifesaving grows
at the rate of inflation, and the money to be spent on lifesaving would, in
the absence of regulation, be invested and made to grow faster than
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122 QUART. J. OF ECON. 39, 59–60 (2007). Ben Trachtenberg, in an article that was
published while this piece was in press, writes that “[s]ince 1980, health [care cost]
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inflation124—game the analysis, making it excessively difficult to justify
regulation.
As a rationale for equal discounting, this variation of the opportunity
cost argument fails completely. It attempts to justify the discounting of
lifesaving benefits on the ground that this discounting will ultimately cause
a larger total number of lives to be saved. Discounting is normally
understood to reflect our understanding of how the present values of the
goods being evaluated will actually change as the timing of the benefits
change. But, accepting for the moment that Graham and Donohue are
correct in their apparent understanding that lifesaving benefits should be
discounted at whatever rate will best point analysts toward saving the
greatest total number of lives with their regulatory budget, recall the
assumptions they make: (1) instead of promulgating the regulation at issue,
the agency could instead cause the regulation’s projected costs to be
invested for future lifesaving; (2) if invested, the averted regulatory costs
could be made to grow faster than inflation; and (3) the inflation-adjusted
cost of lifesaving is static, and so, for example, if a present expenditure of
$1 billion would save 1,000 lives in ten years, then we could also spend (an
inflation-adjusted) $1 billion in 10 years to save 1,000 lives in 20 years.
As discussed above, these assumptions together would create a sort of
“opportunity cost paradox” for an agency that wants to spend the investable
regulatory budget at whatever time it would save the largest number of
lives. Equal discounting would—under these assumptions—simply
paralyze the agency, and thus could not result in the increased lifesaving
that Graham and Donohue predict.
Even if one assumes that this problem has been dealt with, and that
some mechanism (such as a time limit, after which any investment for
future lifesaving must be spent) will ensure that all the investments we
make in lieu of immediate regulation will eventually be spent to save lives,
this rationale for equal discounting still fails.
Return to Graham’s example, where a decision maker can save 1,000
lives (in ten years) by causing $1 billion to be spent today, and this
represents the fixed marginal cost (in current dollars) of saving lives ten
years after the date of the expenditure, and where any of that $1 billion not
immediately spent on regulation could be invested at an inflation-adjusted
3% annual interest rate. One finds that, when the monetized values of the
lifesaving benefits are discounted at the same 3% rate used for costs, we are
indifferent between buying regulatory benefits right now, and investing the
money and buying regulatory benefits at any time in the future.
However, when the lifesaving benefits are discounted at a lower rate
than monetary costs, the value of the lives to be saved in the future exceeds
the value of the (smaller number of) lives that would be saved if the
expenditure were made today. The closer the discount rate for benefits gets
124
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to zero, the more strongly we would prefer later regulatory expenditures,
which would save more lives.
It is important to remember that none of this is relevant to the question
of whether differential discounting is correct in the real world, where at
least two of Graham and Donohue’s key assumptions do not hold. The
point here is that even if all of Graham and Donohue’s assumptions were
correct, this “opportunity cost-plus” argument would still fail to justify a
preference for equal discounting over differential discounting.
III. VALUING FUTURE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Once the discount rate for health and environmental goods is untethered
from the discount rate for money; once neither the concept of opportunity
cost nor any perceived “paradoxes” are understood to compel equal
discounting; and once these discount rates can, therefore, be independently
derived, the question becomes: what should the discount rate for health and
environmental benefits be? Identifying the precise rate(s) that should be
used for these goods is beyond the scope of this paper. 125 However, the
purpose of this section is to establish that, as the time when these benefits
will be enjoyed becomes more distant, the present value of these benefits
generally declines, if at all, much more slowly than the present value of a
monetary benefit would. Therefore the discount rate for health and
environmental goods should be significantly lower than the rate for money.
While the OMB and some law review authors have claimed that there is
a “professional” or “technical” “consensus” in favor of equal discounting in
cost-benefit analysis, 126 there exists a spirited cost-effectiveness analysis
literature that makes the case for differential discounting. While some of
that analysis admittedly cannot be directly applied to cost-benefit analysis,
the arguments made in that literature that health benefits—unlike money—
are becoming more valuable over time have clear applicability to CBA.
Subpart A makes the case that health and environmental goods do not
behave like most other goods (including money), in that we do not
necessarily value additional units of these goods less as we acquire more of
them, and explains why this implies that money should be discounted at a
higher rate than these goods. Subpart B discusses the evidence that the
dollar values of health and environmental goods (as measured by
125

For the Netherlands, the correct discount rate for monetary costs has been estimated to
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individuals’ willingness to pay for them, and the amount individuals must
be compensated before they would willingly give them up) seem to be
rising over time. Subpart B again discusses the work of Sunstein and
Rowell and notes that—in a paper that purports to make the case for equal
discounting—they actually agree in theory to what others have called
differential discounting; if this proposal by Sunstein and Rowell were
actually operationalized, it would go a long way toward improving the
accuracy and rationality of agency cost-benefit analyses.
A. MARGINAL UTILITY
According to the OMB Guidelines, “if consumption continues to
increase over time, as it has for most of U.S. history, an increment of
consumption will be less valuable in the future than it would be today,
because the principle of diminishing marginal utility127 implies that as total
consumption increases, the value of a marginal unit of consumption tends
to decline.”128 But, whether additional units of a good will have a declining
marginal utility will depend on what, exactly, the good is. While some
goods (e.g., money) do have a diminishing marginal utility, other goods
(e.g., saved lives) do not.
As discussed in Part I.A.3.a., supra, the welfare economics premise of
CBA is that a regulation’s true net benefits will be equal to the sum of all
the welfare changes (positive and negative) for all who will be affected by
the regulation. While improving net social welfare may not be the only goal
of government, the impact of a proposed regulation on total social
welfare—assuming, arguendo, that changes in social welfare can be
estimated in any meaningful way—would be at least a relevant
consideration for most policy makers. In part because it is impossible to
know precisely how much “welfare” each affected individual will derive
from any regulation, in practice even the best CBA can only generate a
very rough estimate of the net social benefits (or costs) of the proposal. In
cost-benefit analysis, as it is actually practiced, a dollar given today to
Mark Zuckerberg is considered to improve societal well-being just as much
as a dollar given today to a family living in poverty. In reality, there is a
greater social welfare gain when a dollar is given to the family living in
poverty, because Mark Zuckerberg is a billionaire with so many dollars that
one additional unit of this good will have little or no impact on his welfare.
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Marginal utility is the extra utility derived from each additional unit of a commodity.
See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 89, at 57. Beyond a certain point, “marginal utility
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Unfortunately, CBA, as it is actually practiced, cannot account for this
difference.129
However, because the United States is projected to become wealthier
over time,130 discounting the value of future dollars beyond what is
necessary to control for inflation is seen as a way to account for the fact
that each additional unit of money is worth more to the present than it will
be to the wealthier future.131 While an analyst cannot easily account for the
difference in value between a dollar given to a rich person today and a
dollar given to a poor person today, by discounting money she can at least
account for the difference in value between a dollar given to the wealthier
future, as opposed to the comparatively poor present.
But not all goods have a diminishing marginal utility, and so not all
goods need to be discounted to account for this phenomenon. As others—
primarily in the health economics literature dealing with cost-effectiveness
analysis—have pointed out, the marginal utility of health is very unlikely to
fall as quickly as the marginal utility of money as wealth increases.132
It is possible that as the United States becomes wealthier, we will spend
a greater percentage of our money purchasing healthy food, health club
memberships, and preventative care. But it is also possible that we will
consume more energy from polluting sources, buy more large SUVs, and
take other actions that further decrease our air quality, thereby causing
more asthma attacks and upper respiratory infections, negatively impacting
maternal and fetal health, and further increasing the number of days parents
are asked to keep children in especially polluted areas from playing outside.
If current trends continue, our rates of obesity and diabetes are projected to
continue rising in the future.133 In short, it is possible that, as our nation’s
wealth grows, our health will improve in lockstep, but many of our current
health and consumption patterns would seem to counsel against assuming
such a relationship. Similarly, an analyst should not assume, without
evidence, that the marginal utility of clean water will decrease as we get
wealthier or that the marginal utility of unpolluted air will decrease over
time.134 In fact, an inverse relationship may be more likely, because these
goods may become scarcer as wealth and consumption increase.
129
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For some health goods, marginal utility does not diminish at all. Just as
it is easy to imagine having so much money that an additional dollar
matters little, it is possible to imagine a future population so robustly
healthy that it places a rather low value on additional units of “healthiness.”
But it is very difficult to imagine having so many people alive that we don’t
care whether additional children are killed in traffic accidents. While the
marginal utility of some goods, arguably even some health goods, falls as
more goods are acquired, it is extremely unlikely that in the future the sheer
number of people alive will make us less interested in saving their lives.
Lives saved by regulation are goods that must be included in the costbenefit calculus; however, averted deaths are one case where the value to
society of each additional unit does not decrease as more units are acquired.
In short, if the country is projected to become wealthier, then discounting
money to account for its diminished marginal utility is certainly
appropriate. However, increased wealth will not necessary decrease the
marginal utility of health and environmental goods. In fact, even increased
health would not necessarily decrease the marginal utility of certain of
these goods, such as averted deaths.
B. AS WEALTH INCREASES, THE ACTUAL VALUES OF HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS INCREASE
A related reason to use a lower discount rate for health and
environmental goods than for monetary costs is to account for the fact that
the actual monetized values of health and environmental goods are rising.
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) are the two
methods principally used to arrive at dollar values for goods that are not
traded in markets, and therefore don’t have a ready price. WTP is the
highest price one is willing to pay for a good, while WTA is the minimum
price one would accept to sell it. 135 (For health and environmental goods,
WTA values generally exceed WTP values. 136 While in theory the choice
between WTP and WTA values should be determined by who has the
stronger rights interest in the good in question—the public or the entity
being regulated137—in practice, WTP is the measure that is nearly always
used in CBAs.)
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Evidence shows that our WTP for environmental goods is increasing as
wealth increases, 138 and though WTA values for environmental goods are
not tied as directly to wealth, it makes sense that wealthier individuals (and
societies, for that matter) can better afford to decline opportunities to sell
their environmental resources. Similarly, as our wealth increases, our WTP
and WTA values for health goods will also tend to grow; this phenomenon
is illustrated by the fact that wealthier countries have much higher WTP
and WTA values for health gains and losses than developing nations.139
Indeed, “the evidence that [the value of a statistical life] increases with
wealth is quite strong.”140
Sunstein and Rowell, in addressing this relationship between the value
of a statistical life (VSL) and wealth, make a proposal that—if actually
operationalized—could go a long way toward improving agencies’
economic analyses of regulations:
As we have noted, it is correct to say that national wealth tends to increase
over time, and hence people will likely be wealthier in twenty years than
they now are. Because they will be wealthier, they will demand more to
be subject to statistical risks. For this reason, use of the current VSL to
calculate monetary amounts in the future likely produces unjustifiably low
numbers. But these are not points against discounting. They simply
suggest that the numbers that must be discounted are higher than
regulators currently recognize. The proper analysis uses a multiplier for
138
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national income growth and any other relevant factors, and applies a
discount rate from that point.141

This concession, coming as it does from the current head of OIRA, in a
paper that purports to make the case for equal discounting, is staggering.
Compare the italicized portion of the quote above with the following quote,
which is taken from an article that makes the case for differential
discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis: “This discount rate for health
effects is equal approximately to the discount rate for costs minus the
annual rate of increase in the value of health.”142 Sunstein and Rowell’s
version of equal discounting of lives saved is mathematically identical to
the differential discounting being promoted by some health economists for
use in cost-effectiveness analysis.
To meet the standard for a “proper analysis” described by Sunstein and
Rowell, any equal discounting of monetary and health goods should be
preceded by the appropriate use of multipliers. Unfortunately, their
proposal has not been incorporated into the OMB Guidelines, and the
agency analysts who draft the CBAs reviewed by OIRA still do not apply
“multipliers for national income growth and other factors” before
subjecting intangible public health and environmental benefits to the same
discount rate used for monetary costs.143
CONCLUSION
A 1982 “Handbook on Economic Analysis,” meant to provide guidance
to the practical economist conducting cost-benefit analysis for the
government, provides a number of differential escalation factors intended
to account for the fact that not all goods factored into the CBA should be
discounted at some universal rate. 144 The 1982 handbook contemplates
different discount factors within the same analysis. 145 But, over time, the
notion that different rates might be used to discount different goods within
a single CBA has completely lost credibility among practitioners, to the
point where both the OMB and leading CBA theorists now maintain there
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is a “consensus” among economists that equal discounting is always
required in CBA. 146
While it is probably true that most analysts who produce CBAs for
government agencies have long been resigned to the decades-old
requirement for equal discounting, it is important to remember that this
requirement was first instated by an OMB with an openly deregulatory
agenda and which consistently selected anti-regulation methodologies. The
decision to use equal discounting in regulatory CBAs was not really a case
of the better-reasoned argument prevailing in the free marketplace of ideas.
If an agency must conduct a CBA on a regulation expected to generate
public health or environmental benefits, a better strategy would be to
discount any non-monetary goods at the correct rate for that particular good
in that particular analysis. For health and environmental goods, that rate
should generally be significantly lower than the rate used for money. The
time has come for OMB to reconsider its long-standing directive that
executive agencies must always discount health and environmental benefits
at the same rate as monetary costs; failing this, and given that OMB’s
methodological guidelines are not actually binding on the agencies,
executive agency analysts should nevertheless consider differential
discounting of health and environmental goods to be a legitimate—and
logically defensible—option.
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